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 Since its loss on December 7, 1941, the USS Arizona has been slowly leaking over 9 
liters of oil per day.  This issue has brought about conversations regarding the stability of the 
wreck, and the possibility of defueling the 500,000 to 600,000 gallons that are likely residing 
within the wreck.  Because of the importance of the wreck site, a decision either way is one 
which should be carefully researched before any significant changes occur.  This research would 
have to include not only the ship and its deterioration, but also the oil’s effects on the 
environment.  This thesis combines the historical and current data regarding the USS Arizona 
with case studies of similar situations so a clearer picture of the future of the ship can be 
obtained.   
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Chapter 1: The Day of “Infamy” 
 
December 7, 1941 will forever be etched into history with Franklin D. Roosevelt’s 
unforgettable words, “a date which will live in infamy”1.  During the attack at Pearl Harbor, 
Japanese pilots sank and damaged numerous United States naval vessels. For many though, the 
most notable of these ships was the battleship USS Arizona, which is still lying on the harbor 
floor.  
This thesis will pose the two-part question: Is the wreck of the USS Arizona in danger of 
structural failure on the bottom of Pearl Harbor, and what will be the ship’s continuing legacy 
and effect on the harbor’s environment?  To answer this question I will begin with a pre and post 
depositional technical history of the USS Arizona, which will for the first time combine current 
information on the present condition of the hull and oil supply, with a complete history of the 
ship’s upgrades and refits over time.  Never before has corrosion analysis been combined with 
other current information and included with a thorough historical account of how the vessel 
evolved and was technically modified over time. This assessment allows a full appreciation of 
the potential hazard that the vessel may pose to the harbor’s environment.  In essence the thesis 
will focus on the mechanical history of the USS Arizona before, during, and after its sinking, 
investigating it not only as a historical site, but also as a case study in archaeological site 
formation, in order to describe this dynamic and potentially hazardous artifact.   
The most notable event associated with the USS Arizona is of course the Japanese attack 
at Pearl Harbor.  This, however, was only a moment within the ship’s long and interesting 
history.  Although the USS Arizona did not truly see battle action as a warship prior to its sinking 
                                                 
1
 K.D. Richardson, Reflections of Pearl Harbor (Connecticut: Praeger Publishers, 2005), xi.  
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in 1941, it was a mode of transportation for a president,
2
 and the site of a Hollywood motion 
picture.
3
  Multiple renovations were also performed on the ship during its lifetime, including 
many additions and subtractions to the hull and superstructure that modernized this warship and 
gave it additional capabilities.  The extensive amount of historical information that will be 
included in this thesis gives a more complete and well-rounded history of the ship, one that 
reflects larger trends, both naval and political, of the interwar period. 
When the USS Arizona was built in 1914, it was equipped to operate on oil rather than 
coal.  The Navy Department made this decision for many reasons, both economic and strategic.  
Although there were many perceived tactical benefits of this change, it vastly limited the number 
of strategic ports that the ship could visit, and the presence of oil in its tanks continues to affect 
Pearl Harbor even now, over seventy years after the vessel’s sinking. 
Although the smoke has settled, the memories and feelings that are associated with the 
site of the USS Arizona live on, not only in the minds of veterans, but also of the average citizen, 
including many who may not have even been alive on that fateful day.  Today, the USS Arizona 
memorial stands as a constant reminder of these strong feelings.  The yearly visitation rate of 
approximately 1.5 million people clearly shows that the nation has not forgotten either the battle 
of Pearl Harbor, or the tragedy of the ship that has effectively become the icon of the entire 
disaster.
 4
  Visitors standing in the memorial designed by Alfred Preis are awestruck by the 
shadowy tomb lying barely visible in the dark water below.
5
  Upon closer review of the site, 
many will notice the iridescent sheen of oil droplets floating to the surface. These have been 
                                                 
2
 Paul Stillwell, Battleship Arizona (Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1991), 286. 
3
 Ibid, 133. 
4
 “USS Arizona Memorial,” GORP, accessed August 24, 2010, http://www.gorp.com/parks-guide/travel-ta-u-s-s-
arizona-memorial-hawaii-sidwcmdev_067976.html. 
5
 Stillwell, 286. 
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dubbed the “tears of the Arizona”.6  While symbolic of the brave men who did not survive, these 
“tears” are also a clear and perhaps ominous symptom of a larger problem.  Since it sank in 
1941, the USS Arizona has been slowly leaking oil.  Legend states that the droplets will continue 
until the last survivor from the USS Arizona disaster has passed on.
7
   
To the casual viewer, these slow drops may simply be a non-consequential part of the 
experience.
8
  As of 2006, however, when 8 leakage points were measured, 9 liters were escaping 
on a daily basis (see figure 1).
 9 
 In 1994 the observed loss of oil from the barbette #4 leakage site 
was only 1 drop every three minutes.
10
  This single leak would equate to less than a 1 fluid ounce 
per day.
11
 As figure 1 shows, however, this leak has grown to be an average of 1.2 liters during 
the years between 1994 and 2003.
12
  Although the leakage rates have leveled off or in some cases 
decreased since 2003, these drops could possibly one day turn into a large release of oil that 
would be catastrophic not only in size but in its effects on the environment.   
Naval reports state that on the morning of December 7, 1941, the USS Arizona’s tanks 
were completely full of oil.
13
  This would mean that she was holding approximately 1.5 million 
gallons (5,678,117.68 liters) of heavy #6 bunker fuel oil.
14
  Today it is generally calculated that 
the wreck is currently holding between 500,000 and 600,000 gallons (1,892,705.89 and 
                                                 
6
 Dick Camp, Battleship Arizona’s Marines at War: Making the Ultimate Sacrifice, December 7, 1941 (Minnesota: 
Zenith Press, 2006), 115. 
7
 Priit J. Vesilind, "Oil and Honor at Pearl Harbor," National Geographic, 2001, pg. 86. 
8
 Makinson et al, “In Situ Corrosion Studies on the USS Arizona,” Materials Performance (October 2002):2.  
9
 Matthew A. Russell and Larry E. Murphy, "Long-term Monitoring Program: Structure, Oil, Artifacts and 
Environment," in Long Term Management Strategies for USS Arizona, A Submerged Cultural Resource in Pearl 
Harbor (Santa Fe, NM: Submerged Resources Center, 2008), 412-413, 
http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/UA_ManagementUSS%20Arizona-c.pdf. 
10
 Bradley A. Rodgers, USS Arizona's Oil; How Much Is There, Where Is It, and Can We Find It Before It Finds 
Us?, proceedings of MOP Maritime Symposium, University of Hawai'i, Manoa (2000), pg. 5. 
11
 "German American Corner: General Equivalent Guide," German Corner: German American Magazine and 
Business Guide, section goes here, accessed October 22, 2010, 
http://www.germancorner.com/recipes/hints/units.html. 
12
 Russell and Murphy, “Long-term Monitoring”, 413 
13
 MacKinnon Simpson. USS Arizona, Warship. Tomb. Monument (Hawaii: Bess Press, 2008), 112. 
14
 “FAQ,” NPS.Gov, Accessed August 24, 2010, http://www.nps.gov/valr/faqs.htm. 
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2,271247.07 liters), which could potentially spill out into the small harbor if the hull of the ship 
were to collapse or if the tanks were catastrophically breached.
15
    
The possibility of a catastrophic hull failure is of great concern for everyone involved 
with the conservation of the ship.  Researchers associated with the National Park Service have, in 
the last decade, conducted intensive corrosion studies on the Arizona.  According to this 
research, the corrosion rate is six times faster for the hull structure near the surface than for the 
structure below the mud line.
16
  This is significant because sections of the wreck are buried in 25 
feet of mud.
17
   
The oil currently leaking from the Arizona originates from 11 sites throughout the ship, 
mainly located on the starboard side (see figure 2).
 18
  The oil that is escaping from the “B” sites 
is more weathered than the samples from the “A” sites.  This means that the “B” samples 
generally have had more exposure to seawater, which intuitively shows that these drops are 
emanating from a location closer to the interior of the ship and thus have a longer distance to 
travel before collecting on the exterior of the hull.
19
  This degraded oil is generally believed to be 
coming from secondary oil accumulated in spaces confined within the hull, not in the original oil 
tanks. These spaces perhaps lie under the main and upper decks where oil may have pooled and 
stayed for a period of time. The only unweathered oil originated from the leakage points near 
barbette #4, designated in figure 2 as “Location A”.  This oil most likely is leaking directly from 
                                                 
15
 Rodgers, 7.; Tim Foecke et al., "Investigating Archaeological Site Formation Processes on the Battleship USS 
Arizona Using Finite Element Analysis," Journal of Archaeological Science Xxx (2010): pg. 1. 
16
 Foecke et al, 8. 
17
 Donald Johnson et al., "Corrosion of Steel Shipwrecks in the Marine Environment: USS Arizona Pt. 1," Materials 
Selection and Design, October 2006, pg. 2. 
18
 Amanda Graham, "An Environmental Study off USS Arizona Bunker C Fuel Oil," in Long Term Management 
Strategies for USS Arizona, A Submerged Cultural Resource in Pearl Harbor (Santa Fe, NM: Submerged Resources 
Center, 2008), 311, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/UA_ManagementUSS%20Arizona-c.pdf. 
19
 Ibid, 323. 
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the original oil tanks.
20
  By obtaining information such as this, it should be simpler to determine 
ways to remove the oil if necessary, because it provides researchers with a better understanding 
of where the oil is originating. 
The problem of an oil spill due to corrosion, or any other unforeseen event, could be 
mitigated in theory, although many issues surround this assessment.  One such problem is that 
the oil tanks are currently buried in the harbor’s floor at the bottom of the wrecked ship (see 
figure 3).  This makes direct access to them impossible without significant dredging, which could 
potentially destabilize the wreck.  This also means that the oil tanks located below the mud line 
are likely corroding at a fairly slow rate.  In the event that access to the tanks became possible, 
removal would be made more difficult by the fact that the tanks are spread throughout three 
decks of the ship and separated by bulkheads.  This attribute of the ship, which was originally a 
safety measure, makes removing the oil by inserting a minimal amount of hot taps impossible.
21
   
Despite the difficultly that surrounds the removal of oil from the wreck, the effect on the 
environment that could occur from a catastrophic oil spill should not, and is not being ignored.  
The type of oil that is leaking from the ship is a thick bunker oil.  This type of oil cannot 
evaporate as quickly as some lighter fuels and has shown to persist years after spills.
22
  Even 
twenty years after an oil spill in Nova Scotia, Canada, from the tanker Arrow, bunker oil still 
saturates the surrounding sediment.
23
  In this same light, the sediment around the USS Arizona 
was found to have components that also could be indicative of oil contamination.
24
   
The relatively small amount of oil that is presently leaking from the ship is partially 
degraded by sediment microbes around the ship.  These organisms would not be able to break 
                                                 
20
 Russell and Murphy, “Oil Removal”, 406-408. 
21
 Russell and Murphy, "Long-term Monitoring Program” 391-392. 
22
 Rodgers, 5. 
23
 Graham, 352. 
24
 Ibid, 373. 
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down a massive amount of oil that would be released during a catastrophic hull failure.
25
  
Despite this, the water surrounding the wreck has been visually identified as improving because 
of increased visibility and the recent appearance of yellow seahorses which are vulnerable to 
pollution.
26
  However, no continuous quantitative data of the surrounding environment have been 
recorded since 1988, because of financial restrictions.
27
  This makes it difficult to know the 
current impact of oil on the environment.  For this reason, I hope to use comparative case studies 
to analyze the most likely effects of bunker oil spills.  At the moment, the National Park 
Service’s decision is that because the wreck is a war monument and logistical issues would 
complicate removing the oil that their studies have shown is having a negligible effect on the 
environment, the possible impacts should be remediated, and the oil should not be removed.
28
  
The importance of the USS Arizona is an undeniable fact both historically and as a 
potentially hazardous artifact.  To fully analyze the ship, historical information must be 
combined with current research concerning the degradation of the hull and superstructure, the oil 
leakage, and the effects on the environment.  Each of the subjects presented here are completely 
explored in later chapters, thereby informing the reader of the site formation processes that make 
this artifact as potentially dangerous to the surrounding environment as it is historically 
significant. 
To begin this narrative, it is important to point out that, like any active human system, the 
USS Arizona was constantly changed and upgraded.  The vessel that exploded and subsequently 
sank on December 7
th
 1941 was not the same battleship that was launched in 1915.  The 
                                                 
25
 Ibid, 375 
26
 David Lindsay, "Seahorses: Flagships of Our Coasts," CSA.com, May 2003, Threats to Seahorses, accessed April 
10, 2012, http://www.csa.com/discoveryguides/seahorses/overview.php. 
27
 Russell and Murphy, “Long-Term Monitoring Program”, 421. 
28
 Matthew A. Russell and Larry E. Murphy, "Oil Removal Versus Site Preservation," in Long Term Management 
Strategies for USS Arizona, A Submerged Cultural Resource in Pearl Harbor (Santa Fe, NM: Submerged Resources 
Center, 2008), 421, http://www.history.navy.mil/branches/UA_ManagementUSS%20Arizona-a.pdf. 
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following will explore both the original construction and the technical improvements that this 
historical ship underwent during its lifetime. 
Ship’s History 
A chill was in the air on March 16, 1914.  Gathered at the New York Naval Yard were 
hundreds of spectators awaiting the ceremony surrounding the construction of a new American 
battleship.  At this point the ship was unnamed, known only by its battleship designation number, 
BB-39.
29
  This was to be the second of the Pennsylvania class ships.
30
  Once the Assistant 
Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, arrived in his derby hat, the bands began to play 
and the guns fired a salute.
31
   
The first materials for the ship were ordered on September 18
th
, 1913 and, although the 
keel had not yet been laid, construction had already begun on some of the hull plating.
32
  The 
keel being laid on the morning of the ceremony was comprised of three fifty-foot long plates.  
During the festivities, these were temporarily connected with nickel bolts placed by five young 
sons of naval officers.  Henry Williams Jr., whose father was a naval constructor, was one of the 
boys chosen.  For reasons not completely clear, the young boy was drawn to Roosevelt.  
Williams stated later about the event, “I grabbed his finger and hung on for dear life.  And they 
tried to get me away, and, of course, I was a little ham.  FDR, being a bit of a ham himself, I 
guess he saw the possibilities or whatever it might be for all the picture taking…So…he shooed 
them away, and I stayed hanging onto his hand” (see image 1).33 Because of the sudden 
publicity, Williams was given the honor of placing the first bolt.   These bolts would later be 
                                                 
29
 Stillwell,3. 
30
 Daniel A. Martinez, "USS Arizona," in Submerged Cultural Resources Study USS Arizona Memorial and Pearl 
Harbor National Historic Landmark (Santa Fe: Southwest Cultural Resources Center Professional Papers No. 23, 
2001), 24. 
31
 Stillwell,3. 
32
Norman Friedman et al., USS Arizona (BB39) (Annapolis, MD: Leeward Pub., 1978), 4-6. 
33
 Stillwell,4. 
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replaced by steel rivets, with the nickel bolts being given back to the boys as a souvenir.
34
  The 
rivets permanently hammered into the ship’s keel remain today, holding together the twisted 
remains of the Arizona. 
After the festivities had concluded, the real work began.  Only one day after the 
ceremony ended, the ship was already beginning to take shape.  One-hundred and fifty frames 
were placed, each spaced four feet apart.  Once the final rib had been attached on April 2, 1913, 
the workers began to construct the athwartship bulkheads, thus creating watertight spaces 
throughout the ship.  As was previously mentioned, the remains of these bulkheads are still 
affecting the ship today.  Two months after the bulkheads were completed, some of the largest 
components, including the stem and stern posts, were installed.  Approximately 6,000 tons of 
armor plating was also attached to the ship at this time.  Finally, on May 20, 1915, one of the 
final components, the all-important rudder, was attached.  Only 14 months after the keel was 
laid, the USS Arizona was nearing completion.
35
 
Although its class and designation number were known, the ship still did not have an 
official name.  On June 19, 1915, the USS Arizona was pushed into the water and the naming 
ceremony began.  A law passed by Congress in 1898, determined that all battleships be named 
after states.
36
  For this newly built ship, the honor was given to the 48
th
 state, which at that point 
was the newest in the union.
37
  Arizona had become a state only years earlier on St. Valentine’s 
Day 1912.
38
  Esther Ross, a descendant of one of Arizona’s pioneer families, was chosen to 
christen the vessel the USS Arizona (see image 2).
39
 
                                                 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 Friedman et al., 4. 
36
 Simpson, 6, 15. 
37
 Daniel J. Lenihan, ed., Submerged Cultural Resources Study: USS Arizona Memorial and Pearl Harbor National 
Historic Landmark (Santa Fe: Submerged Cultural Resources Unit, Southwest Cultural Resources Center, 1989), 24. 
38
 Stillwell, 9. 
39
 Ibid, 4-10. 
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The ship had been launched, but it had not yet been completed.  Some of the components 
of the ship, such as the turrets and guns, were yet to be added.  The installation of the ship’s main 
armor belt was also postponed, as the additional weight could have been detrimental to the 
launching ramp.
40
  Even after the ship was fitted out, it was months before the Arizona was 
officially commissioned because it had not yet undergone sea trials.
41
   
The USS Arizona was commissioned on October 17, 1916, costing the Navy 16 million 
dollars and two and a half years in construction.  John D. McDonald was chosen to be the first 
commanding officer of the newest American battleship.  He had received his training at the 
Naval Academy, where he graduated in 1884.  In total, McDonald had thirty-two years of service 
before he took on the responsibility of commanding the historic ship.
42
 
The USS Arizona was the second of the two Pennsylvania class ships that were built.  
Although this class was similar to the earlier Nevada class ships, the plans for the Pennsylvania 
class had called for an even larger, faster, and more heavily built warship.
43
  Both Pennsylvania 
class ships, the USS Arizona and the USS Pennsylvania, were built on the East Coast of the 
United States and were involved in Pearl Harbor.  Although the USS Arizona was sunk in the 
attack, the USS Pennsylvania was repaired and later served in the Pacific theater of World War 
II.
44
 
When completed, the USS Arizona was 608 feet long, with a beam of 97 feet, 1 inch.  Its 
draft was 28 feet 10 inches and in total, the ship displaced 31,400 tons.
45
  Combined with the 
weaponry, these attributes made the USS Arizona a powerful battleship during that era (see 
                                                 
40
 Friedman et al, 4.  
41
 Ibid. 
42
 Stillwell, 12. 
43
 Friedman et al., 4.; Department of the Navy, 2001.    
44
 Department of the Navy, 2001.   
45
 Martinez, 24.   
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figure 4).  In the U.S. Navy, the Pennsylvania class ships were second only to the New Mexico 
class in total displacement and length.
46
  The USS Nevada, which had been built one year earlier, 
had a displacement of only 27,000 tons, and was 33 feet shorter than the Arizona.
47
  The 
Arizona’s overall size, strength of battery, and all turbine engineering made this vessel one of the 
United States’ first super dreadnoughts.48   
The firepower housed on the USS Arizona was another improvement over many other 
battleships built around the same time. The Arizona was outfitted with twelve 14-inch/45 caliber 
guns.
49
  Comparatively, the British dreadnought Queen Elizabeth (BB-9), built in 1913, had four 
double turrets equipped with eight 15-inch/42 caliber guns.
50
  Caliber on warships at that time 
was a measurement of length, and specifically refers to the length of the gun barrel as multiples 
of the bore diameter. To determine the actual length of the barrel, the bore diameter of 14 inches 
is multiplied by 45, the caliber, indicating a 630-inch (52.5 foot) long barrel.
51
   
The 14-inch/45 caliber guns were mounted in four triple turrets, two aft, and two 
forward.
52
  The term “triple turret” means each had three barrels that fired at nearly the same 
time.  Because there was a danger of the middle shell colliding with the other two midair, the 
center barrel was timed to shoot a fraction of a second later than the outer two.
53
  These main 
guns could fire a 1,500-pound artillery shell 23,000 yards, a process that required four 100-
pound silk bags of gunpowder. When fired, the massive shells turned one full clockwise rotation 
                                                 
46
 Jane’s Publishing Company, Jane's Fighting Ships of World War I (London, Eng.: Studio Editions, 1990), 133-
136. 
47
 Martinez, 40, Michael Mohl, "BB-39 USS Arizona," NavSource Online: Battleship Photo Archive, Pennsylvania 
Class Battleship, accessed August 24, 2011, http://www.navsource.org/archives/01/39a.htm.;  
48
 Joy Waldron. Jasper, James P. Delgado, and Jim Adams, The USS Arizona: the Ship, the Men, the Pearl Harbor 
Attack, and the Symbol That Aroused America (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2001), 27; Stillwell, 4. 
49
 Lenihan, 24. 
50
 Janes, 35. 
51
 Richard D. Camp, Battleship Arizona's Marines at War: Making the Ultimate Sacrifice, December 7, 1941 (St. 
Paul, MN.: Zenith Press, 2006), 19. 
52
 Friedman et al., 10-11. 
53
 Simpson, iii. 
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for every 37.3 feet of forward momentum.  This was due to the rifling in the barrel, which 
greatly improved the gun’s accuracy. 54  The USS Arizona’s large firing capacity gave the 
battleship a 13,500 pound salvo weight.  This placed the Arizona on par with the most powerful 
battleships of any foreign power at the time.
55
   
The turrets housing the 14-inch guns were heavily built and set on cylindrical armored 
barbettes that extended deep into the hull of the ship.
56
  To operate each of the ship’s turrets, 25 
men had to be inside the section visible above the deck, also known as the gunhouse, while 45 
men worked the artillery hoists and magazines below.
57
  Each gunhouse rotated separately on 
bearings on the rim of the barbettes, which served as shelter for the shells, powder hoists, and the 
gun’s elevating machinery.58 
Although the main turrets contained the most powerful guns, the USS Arizona also had 
supplementary batteries.  The battleship was equipped with twenty-two 5-inch/51 caliber guns.
59
  
Surrounding each 5-inch gun was an individual 12x20 foot casemate with a convex outer 
bulkhead.  When not in use, canvas covered the openings, except in inclement weather when 
metal doors with rubber gaskets created watertight seals.
60
  These guns provided protection from 
torpedo boat attack, and were methodically placed to cover all possible low angles.  To achieve 
this, two of the guns were placed next to the conning tower, eight were mounted under the 
forecastle deck on both the starboard and port sides, and the final four were divided between the 
two sides of the second deck near the stern.
61
  Aiming the 5-inch guns at horizontal angles of 90 
to 120 degrees was possible, but, because of the restrictive openings in the casemates, the guns 
                                                 
54
 Friedman et al., 25. 
55
 Friedman et al.,10-11.;Camp, 19. 
56
 Ibid, 10-11. 
57
 Camp, 19. 
58
 Friedman et al., 10-11. 
59
 Ibid, 11. 
60
 Camp, 20. 
61
 Friedman et al., 11. 
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could only be raised to an elevation of 20 degrees.
62
  The low angle of elevation and the slow 
operating time made these 5-inch guns ineffective against aircraft.
63
 
In 1917, the U.S. Navy installed four 3-inch/50 caliber guns on the ship to help remedy 
the problem caused by the lack of anti-aircraft guns.  Half of the new guns were mounted on the 
No. 3 turret, while the other two were placed on the forward deckhouse.  These guns were 
chosen because their 50 caliber shells were large enough to create both an explosion and 
shrapnel sufficient to take down a plane.
64
 
In addition to the superstructure guns, the USS Arizona was built with two underwater 
torpedo tubes.  Originally, the Pennsylvania class ships were designed to have four tubes, but 
half were removed from the Arizona’s plans before construction.  The remaining torpedo tubes 
were placed on either side of the ship, below the waterline.  While the effects of a direct hit from 
a torpedo would be substantial, the battleship was not sufficiently maneuverable to effectively 
deliver the weapons.  This was mainly due to the long lag time between release of the torpedo 
and its impact with the proposed target.
65
 
The ship that housed the aforementioned guns was built with a ram type bow.  This bow 
had sharp ends that reached the upper decks and quickly flared out to be rounded.  This shape cut 
down on water resistance, thereby increasing the ship’s speed.  The stern was a “cruiser” type, 
equipped with one semi-balanced rudder.
66
  A cruiser stern was traditionally used on battleships 
of the era because the sharp curve up from the waterline ensured that the rudder would be 
continually submerged while the ship was under normal loads.  This was essential, as an exposed 
                                                 
62
 Camp, 20. 
63
 Friedman et al., 11. 
64
 Ibid. 
65
 Ibid, 12-27. 
66
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rudder would quickly become a target.
67
  The hull itself was constructed of steel frames laid at 
90° from the keel, in the traditional shipbuilding manner.  The frames braced three decks within 
the hull, extending the length of the ship at a consistent height.  The uppermost main deck was 
utilized as both crew housing and protection for the machinery associated with the windlass.  
This was possible because the forecastle deck extended from frame 88, just forward of the 
mainmast, to the bow, thus protecting the main deck below.
68
   
As originally built, the tallest points of the USS Arizona were the two cage style masts 
extending from the deck (see image 3).  The masts became wider as they descended toward the 
deck, which increased the strength of the structure.  Along the masts, at specific elevations, were 
wire gratings that created landings with attached ladders.  This allowed sailors access to the eight 
searchlight areas and spotting tops.  At the top of each of these masts was a variety of equipment 
including the spotting area, yardarms, antenna supports, searchlight platforms, and torpedo 
control platforms.
69
 
Attached aft of the No. 2 turret was the armored conning tower.  This was built high 
enough to allow the flag officers to see past both the stern and forward turrets.  Each side of the 
tower had three viewing ports, and was armored with 16 inches of case hardened steel.  The 
forward end of the interior conning tower housed the ship’s control, while opposite this was the 
fire control.  Attached to the starboard, port, and aft sides of the conning tower was a bridge.  
Below this bridge was an open-wing chart house that surrounded an enclosed chart table.  The 
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conning tower and associated bridges were supported by both the forward deckhouse, and three 
longitudinal and transverse bulkheads that extended down to the armored deck.
70
 
Attached to the superstructure deck were two deckhouses.  The first of these was attached 
to the No. 2 barbette, on the aft end.  Contained within this deckhouse were many necessities of 
shipboard life.  The starboard side of this structure held the Captain’s stateroom, while opposite 
this, on the port side, was the bakery.  The addition of this deckhouse also protected the 
communication tubes from damage.  
The aft deckhouse, much like the bakery in the forward structure, was mainly food 
related.  Contained here, located between the stack and the end of the forecastle deck at frame 
88, was the butcher’s shop, crew galley, and perishable storage.  Aft of frame 88, the main deck 
was unprotected and thus called the quarterdeck for the sake of differentiation.
71
 
Below the main deck, the second deck had many uses, mostly associated with crew 
necessities.  Starting at the No. 1 barbette and continuing forward was the area designated for the 
Chief Petty Officers’ cabins, as well as the sickbay.  Aft of this area was the laundry, carpenter’s 
shop, and shipfitters.  The majority of the men lived within the midships area of the Arizona, 
with the officers living aft of frame 91.
72
   
Deck three was the location of most of the ship’s storerooms.  Also included on this deck 
were the boiler uptakes and ammunition passages.  Beneath the third deck were two additional 
sub-decks, which were connected between the machinery spaces, and the respective forward and 
aft ends of the ship.  The lowest deck was the engineering hold where the heavy machinery and 
engines were housed.
73
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The Arizona’s original eight Parsons turbines were located within the deepest area of the 
ship.
74
  Along with the turbines were twelve Babcock and Wilcox boilers.  These were an oil-
powered watertube type.  Each boiler had a heating surface of 6,916.5 square feet, for a 
combined total of 55,332 square feet.  As originally constructed, 313.5 tons of reserve water and 
2,332 tons of fuel oil were contained within the ship.
75
  These turbines and boilers provided the 
ship with 33,375 horsepower and a top speed of 21 knots.
76
  Comparatively, the slightly larger 
New Mexico class ships produced between 27,500 and 32,000 horsepower.
77
 
While different combinations of the available turbines were used depending on the 
battleship’s situation, it is clear that American engineering design was in the experimental stage 
and likely not as advanced as the British Royal Navy.  Speeds below seventeen knots used the 
two cruising and low-pressure turbines connected to the outboard propeller shafts.
78
  Each of 
these shafts had their own engine room located below the mainmast.
79
  Between these two engine 
rooms was a third, housing the two inboard shafts, controlled by an equal number of high-
pressure turbines.  This setup was not highly efficient.  Whenever the ship went astern, there was 
no way to stop the ahead low-pressure turbines, and vice versa.  In addition, while moving at 
lower speeds, the boiler steam had to pass through the cruising turbines before it went through 
the high and low-pressure turbines. At higher speeds though, the steam was shunted around the 
cruising turbines which created a more efficient cycle. The lack of a clutch system to disengage 
some of the turbines while engaging others did not allow for efficient fuel-oil usage.
80
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The direct drive turbine system was at times the least of the problems associated with the 
turbines.  While performing maneuvers on the York River, Captain McDonald called for the 
turbines to reverse at full speed and was surprised when the chief engineer, Lieutenant 
Commander Harold G. Bowen, did not protest.  When later asked about the incident, Bowen 
commented, “Everyone knew the Arizona was no good and the sooner the turbines were 
completely busted up and some new ones put in the better it would be for everyone.”81  It was 
even said that a favorite sport of the sailors was listening for the rubbing of the turbine blades.  
On December 7, 1916, soon after the commissioning of the ship, and twenty-five years to the day 
before the USS Arizona would be destroyed, the blades of the starboard low-pressure turbine 
were stripped.  The repairs for this problem forced the vessel to stay in New York Navy Yard for 
three months.
82
  The changes to the ship were time consuming and expensive.  To repair the 
problem, large areas of the top decks had to be removed to allow the crane room to lift out the 
blades.  The items were then taken to a machine shop, repaired, and replaced.
83
 
Although the ship left the yard in March 1917, the problem was not truly solved.  The 
vessel’s chief engineer, Bowen, made it his mission to solve the issues associated with the 
turbines.  After inspecting the machinery and the blueprints associated with them, Bowen came 
up with an amazingly simple solution to what had become a costly problem.  After obtaining 
permission from the Bureau of Engineering, Bowen shaved .02 of an inch off the rotor and all 
the blades of one of the problematic turbines.  This small change eliminated the rubbing, the 
possibility of damage, and added fuel efficiency.  After seeing the beneficial results, the rest of 
the ship’s rotors and blades were shaved in the same manner.  This change helped to stem 
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significant problems until the turbines were replaced in 1929 during one of the modernizations of 
the ship.
84
 
The fuel oil needed to power the turbines created additional problems for the ship.  
Although the USS Arizona had just been built, it was unable to fight in World War I because of 
the lack of oil in Europe.  In 1917, five American dreadnoughts, the Texas, Wyoming, New York, 
Delaware, and Florida, were all relocated to the British Isles to assist in the fight against the 
German fleet.  The dreadnoughts that were sent were all coalburners.  Instead of steaming to 
Europe, the Arizona was stationed on the Chesapeake Bay and used as a gunnery-training vessel 
for the men who would then be placed upon commercial and naval escort ships which would 
fight in World War I.
85
  
As described, the USS Arizona was one of the United States’ first oil-fueled battleships.86  
The ship’s tanks held a maximum of 2,332 tons (approximately 596,992 gallons) of this precious 
commodity, contained within 200 bunkers throughout the ship.
87
  Originally, the Arizona had the 
capability to travel approximately 4,000 miles.  This would be extended later in the ship’s life to 
reflect its mission as an oceanic patrol and combatant.  Although the choice of oil as a fuel type 
would be an issue that would plague the ship even to this day, the distance the ship could travel 
without refueling was impressive.  Comparable English battleships of the time were only able to 
travel approximately 400 miles without refueling.
88
 
The coal needed to power other ships has, since the beginning of the age of steam, 
betrayed them by sending up black plumes of smoke through the stacks, alerting all within sight 
                                                 
84
 Ibid, 28. 
85
 Stillwell, 22. 
86
 Friedman et al., 33. 
87
 Friedman et al., 16; "How Much, For What, and Ending Up Where?," Global Marine Oil Pollution Information 
Gateway, Oil Entering the Marine Environment, accessed September 26, 2011, 
http://oils.gpa.unep.org/facts/quantities.htm. 
88
 Friedman et al., 2-3. 
18 
 
of their presence.  In addition to this, coal was highly detrimental to the health of the engine 
crew, otherwise known as the “black gang.”89  Coal-fueled ships had to be refueled every couple 
of weeks.  This grueling process took multiple days, including additional days of cleaning to 
remove all of the fine coal dust which inevitably covered every surface.
90
   
Likely however, the most influential of the reasons for the transition to oil was 
economics.  The number of firemen needed on an oil-fueled ship could be reduced by up to 70 
percent.  This was a reduction, not only in paychecks, but also in how many men were fed at the 
end of each day.  Oil-powered ships also had the capability to carry more cargo if needed 
because they were more efficient, as oil generates more British Thermal Units ( BTUs) than coal.  
In addition, oil took up less space within the ship than did an equal amount of coal.  
Approximately six tons of oil could do the same job as ten tons of coal.
91
  A metric ton of coal 
will produce 22.9 million BTUs, while an equal metric ton of fuel oil will create 42.5 million 
BTUs.  That is nearly an 86 percent increase in productivity.
92
 
While the decision to construct an oil-based battleship may have initially made the 
Arizona modern, many modifications throughout the ship’s lifetime changed its physical 
appearance.  One of the first major overhauls that the ship underwent began in 1919.
93
  Between 
June 1919 and January 1920, the USS Arizona remained in the New York Naval Shipyard for 
maintenance and upgrades.
94
  At that time the two cage masts were equipped with fire-control 
tops, built by removing the V-shaped front screens and replacing them with new octagonal 
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torpedo defense systems.  This addition was appreciated by the sailors as the roof and windows 
gave the men more protection from the elements.
 95
   
Although the years between 1921 and 1928 were generally routine for the men living 
onboard the ship, it was renovated again in 1925.  During the three-month process, many 
changes occurred that affected the hull and superstructure of the battleship.  One of the most 
apparent changes was the addition of an airplane catapult on the stern of the ship.  The catapult 
operated on compressed air.  Ironically, this instantly made the catapult obsolete, as the newer 
systems used powder charges that launched the planes at a much faster rate.
96
  The USS 
Arizona’s less efficient compressed air catapults could only launch small planes in ideal weather 
conditions.  This however was only half of the problem.  The planes, once launched from this 
less efficient system, were unable to return to the ship and instead had to land ashore.  This 
restricted the amount of information the pilots could easily report back after missions.
97
  In later 
years, the ship was updated to have not only more efficient catapults, but also a crane to lift the 
planes back onto the ship after making a water landing.
98
 
Many of the USS Arizona’s other 1925 renovations were focused on improved weaponry 
and crew work areas.  New 5-inch and 14-inch guns were installed with hydro-pneumatic 
counter-recoil systems.  A new plotting room was also built so the guns could be more accurately 
aimed.  Gun turret rooms were made safer with the installation of sprinklers, which prevented a 
fire from engulfing the rest of the ship.  The navigation bridge, which had formerly been bitterly 
cold and uninhabitable during the winter, was improved with the addition of bulkheads to 
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enclose the area and make it more hospitable for the men.
99
  Lastly, in the engineering 
department, six hundred tons of fuel-oil were added to the ship’s capacity.  The ship could now 
steam approximately 9,000 miles while cruising at ten knots.
100
 
Three years before the Arizona’s 1925 renovations, the Washington Naval Limitations 
Treaty began to greatly affect the lives of battleships built around the turn of the century.
101
  
Under the provisions of this treaty, a battleship was deemed out of service 20 years after it was 
built.  When construction on the replacement ship was completed, the former would be 
decommissioned.  Taking into account the amount of time required to build a new battleship, the 
USS Arizona could have been decommissioned around 1940, one year before the ship was lost at 
Pearl Harbor.  Instead, many ships like the Arizona were modified to bring them up to the current 
standards, thereby postponing decommission.  The treaty allowed for an addition of 3,000 tons to 
the ships to modernize them.  Because of the time frame, construction was begun on the oldest 
ships first, with the USS Arizona not being authorized for updates until February 25, 1929.
102
  
On May 4 of that year, the ship returned to its original home port of Norfolk to undergo the 
largest of its overhauls.  It remained there under reduced commission until July of the same 
year.
103
  
Many changes were made to the superstructure of the ship during this modernization.  An 
additional forecastle deck was added, which spanned from the No. 2 turret aft until the break at 
frame 88.  Above this superstructure deck, a new flag bridge and deckhouse were also built.  
Even though the USS Arizona was a divisional flagship, prior to the modernization of 1929, the 
ship had not had a sufficient bridge. The new structure had multiple levels, making it one of the 
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taller points of the ship, and allowing the captain better visibility.  An emergency platform with 
both a chart house and sea cabins for the flag and chief of staff were also built above the main 
bridge.  Above this was a navigation bridge, with a range-finding platform located on top. 
104
  
One of the most visible changes during the 1929 modernization was the removal of the 
ship’s cage masts.  These were replaced by the more modern fore and aft tripod type.105  This 
update occurred partially because the older cage masts were known to sway dramatically after a 
turret gun salvo, and could be significantly damaged in heavy seas.  The newly installed tripod 
masts were more utilitarian and stable.
106
   
Attached to the outside of the ship in 1929 was armor in the form of blisters.  These 
protected against the possibility of a torpedo attack, and made the ship more stable (see image 
4).
107
  Each blister was composed of 70-pound specially treated steel.
108
  In theory, if the ship 
were to be hit with a torpedo, the warhead would explode upon impact with the blister thus 
protecting the vital internal components.  These blisters were constructed of four separate tanks.  
The two central tanks were filled with oil, whereas the exterior and interior tanks were kept 
empty to create a barrier between any torpedoes and vital areas of the ship.
109
  By adding oil to 
the two central tanks, the available fuel capacity grew from approximately 2,932 tons to 4,630 
tons.
 110
  In emergency situations, this could be increased to 6,180 tons.  This allowed the ship to 
travel 13,600 nautical miles at 15 knots, 8,850 miles further than before the fuel enlargement.
111
  
The addition of the armor blisters also increased the beam of the ship from 97.5 feet to 106 feet 
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2
3/4
inches.
112
  If the ship was any wider, it would be unable to pass through the Panama Canal, 
which was only 110 feet wide.
113
   
The added stability and floatation provided by the torpedo blisters allowed for more 
armor to be installed on the superstructure. The ultimately legitimate fear of an air-based attack 
also led to additional armor being placed below the upper decks.
114
  Two inches were added to 
the main deck to protect the armor deck within, while one inch was added to each turret top to 
protect the ship from overhead attacks.  This meant that five inches of armor were now 
protecting the main deck.  However, since this armor resided in two layers, it was not equivalent 
to a solid 5-inch plate.
115
   
The changes to the ship’s superstructure were not solely beneficial.  Because the hull 
shape was changed, the battleship’s top speed was decreased by 0.3 knots.116  Another problem 
with the 1929 additions was the significant amount of weight added to the ship.  To compensate 
for this, new turbines and Bureau Express three-drum boilers were installed.
117
  The new boilers 
were more efficient and three alone could do the work of the previous twelve.  The turbines that 
the Arizona obtained were inherited from the Washington, since work on that ship had ceased 
after the 1922 Washington Treaty.
118
 
The USS Arizona’s guns were also affected by the 1929 renovation.  The 5-inch/51 
caliber guns originally attached to the ship were less useful after tactical changes that had 
occurred between World War I and World War II.  Originally, the fear of attack came from water 
launched torpedoes.  By the time of the 1929 modernizations, the tactics favored air-based 
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torpedo attacks.  The original 5-inch/51 caliber guns were attached to the ship at such a low 
angle that they were rendered useless whenever any amount of weather occurred.  For these 
reasons, only 12 of the original 5-inch/51 caliber guns were left on the ship after modernization.  
The remaining guns were either moved up a deck and enclosed in the newly built superstructure 
deckhouse or placed next to the conning tower.
119
     
The USS Arizona was also equipped during this time with eight 5-inch/25 caliber guns.  
These were mounted equally on either side of the newly built superstructure deckhouse.  Each of 
these semi-automatic guns was placed in a way that allowed them to aim at both air and surface 
targets.
120
   
During the reconstruction of the ship, eight .50 caliber heavy machine gun mounts were 
installed high on the tripod masts, although the actual guns were not added to the ship until 1933.  
Modeled after the highly successful Browning water-cooled gun used in World War I, the .50 
caliber guns had a high fire rate and ease of use, which made them perfect for bringing down 
aircraft.
121
 
The last armament change occurring during the modernization of 1929 was the removal 
of the torpedo tubes.  As previously mentioned, the USS Arizona was originally designed with 
four tubes; however, by the time she was actually constructed, the ship was only built with two.  
The amount of space the torpedo rooms occupied prompted the Navy to remove them.  These 
rooms interrupted the continuous line of the side protection system, making the ship more 
vulnerable to attack.  After removal, the area previously containing the torpedo rooms was 
subsequently integrated into the ship’s armor blister.122    
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Although the USS Arizona was overhauled five more times between 1934 and 1941, only 
minor changes occurred.  The Emergency Anti-Aircraft Improvement Program required four 
mounts for the newly produced 1.1-inch guns on every ship that would be operating in the 
Pacific.  On the USS Arizona, two 5-inch/51 caliber guns that had previously been mounted on 
either side of the conning tower were removed in favor of the new 1.1-inch anti-aircraft guns.  
Although foundations, ammunition hoists, and ready service lockers were built to accommodate 
these guns, neither the mounts nor the guns themselves were ever installed.
123
 
The final changes that occurred on the USS Arizona involved the .50 caliber weapons.  
These anti-aircraft guns were relocated multiple times, but by the time of the Pearl Harbor attack, 
the guns were placed in the following configuration.  Two .50 caliber guns taken from the 
mainmast replaced four of the searchlights, while another four were installed on the newly 
created “bird’s nest” platform on top of the mainmast’s director tower.  The four searchlights that 
were removed were placed on the mainmast (see image 5).
124
 
The Attack 
At the time of the USS Arizona’s final modifications, the ship had already relocated to 
the United States Pacific Fleet due to increased Japanese hostilities. 
125
  In 1937, Japan invaded 
and viciously attacked China.  Horrified, the United States watched the atrocities being 
committed against the Chinese people.  Later the same year, the Japanese further damaged 
relations with America when they bombed and sank the American gunboat Panay, afterwards 
explaining it away as an accident.  As aggressions heightened in 1940, the Japanese allied with 
the German and Italian forces.  This move encouraged President Roosevelt to place an embargo 
on imported Japanese supplies, such as steel, gasoline, and oil.  In addition to this, Roosevelt 
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moved the Pacific Naval Fleet to Pearl Harbor, hoping its presence would discourage further 
Japanese aggression.
126
   
Sadly, this was not the case.  The Japanese Commander-in-Chief of the Combined Fleet, 
Isoroku Yamamoto, prepared detailed plans for an assault on Pearl Harbor.  Yamamoto knew 
that the Japanese would not be able to fight a long-standing war with the United States and 
would need instead to rely on a devastating first strike, thereby taking the American forces by 
surprise.  Yamamoto’s plan involved the use of carriers to transport the attack force, backed by 
submarines and secondary midget subs, both of which would quietly launch when they neared 
the Hawaiian Islands.
127
    
At 7:53 a.m. on December 7, 1941 Japanese planes flew over Pearl Harbor.   Within the 
next thirty-two minutes, twenty-seven dive bombers and twenty-four Japanese torpedo planes 
were attacking Ford Island and Pearl Harbor.  The Pennsylvania was the first vessel hit during 
the attack and it caught fire.  Ship after ship was hit, causing extensive damage.  The Japanese 
were not only targeting ships though, air strips, hangars, and civilian sites were also under 
attack.
128
   
At the time of the attack, the USS Arizona was berthed in the F-7 slot, alongside the 
repair ship USS Vestal (see image 6).
129
 At 8:05 a.m., as the men rushed through the ship, a 500-
pound bomb dropped onto the Arizona.  It exploded in the flag officer’s pantry, after glancing off 
the No. 4 turret and penetrating the deck.  The men who were in the No. 3 turret remember best 
the sparks and sickening gas emitted from the compartment after the bomb went off.
130
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Five Japanese Nakajima B5N (aka Kate) bombers, flying in a “V” formation, attacked the 
battleship Arizona and the adjacent repair ship USS Vestal.
131
  Included in this group, and flying 
at over 10,000 feet, was Lieutenant Shojira Kondo, who released an armor piercing bomb from 
his plane.  It struck the forecastle deck on the starboard side before ripping through four decks 
near the No. 2 turret and exploding.
132
  This bomb is generally credited as the death blow to the 
Arizona.
133
  Those who were spared remember the bomb making a very distinctive sound.  
Private First Class James Cory recalled: “The bomb struck forward of us.  You could feel it 
penetrate the decks and then there was this big ‘Whoosh!’  Now it wasn’t a Bang.  It wasn’t a 
Boom. It was a Whoosh!”134  As the bomb hit, men stationed on other vessels recall seeing 
bodies thrown into the air.
135
  William Goshen was on the USS Arizona when this bomb hit.  He 
remembers being thrown into the air and landing in the dangerous waters below.  Although he 
survived, 70 percent of his body was covered in flash burns.
136
  Although, in many cases, they 
were burned beyond recognition, it is possible that during one of the explosions some of the men 
from the USS Arizona were even thrown onto the decks of the nearby USS Vestal.
137
 
If the bombs had not created enough damage by themselves, their positioning secured the 
fate of the Arizona.  Many believe that as the explosion from Lieutenant Kondo’s bomb ripped 
through the ship, it ignited the Arizona’s 582 tons of 14-inch ammunition and fuel.138  The fire 
burned hot, killing and maiming sailors as it quickly moved through the ship.  James Cory 
remembers watching the burned and half-dead men walk through the decks like zombies.  He 
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recalls that the only remaining identifiable item on many of the men were the soles of their 
shoes.  Only one man, Corporal Burnis Leroy Bond, made it out of casemate ten, only to die 
before he could be evacuated.
139
   
Those who were able to make it off the ship still had a difficult and perilous journey 
before them.  Some found their way back to Ford Island by way of motorboats manned by those 
who had already made it off the burning ships. Others were forced to swim back to shore while 
facing debilitating injuries sustained during the attack.  Adding to the intensity of this journey 
was the oil burning on the surface of the water.  Ironically though, the one saving grace found on 
the water for some was an oil pipeline standing about a foot out of the water (see image 7).  
Many used this to help to pull themselves through the water toward Ford Island.
140
   
Although the accounts differ regarding the amount and type of attack that the USS 
Arizona endured, the most likely scenario included four bomb hits.  The first hit was near frame 
85 on the port side.  The second was also on the port side, near frame 96.  A third bomb, as 
mentioned, ricocheted off the No. 4 turret and detonated in the Captain’s Pantry.  The final and 
most devastating of the bombs hit on the forward starboard side of the No. 2 turret.
141
  The USS 
Arizona was home to 1,514 men at the time of the attack.  After the smoke had cleared, 1,177 of 
these men had lost their lives.  This equates to a 78 percent death rate on the USS Arizona.  
Nearly half of the total Navy and Marine fatalities from the Pearl Harbor attack came from this 
single ship.
142
  
From Sunday the 7
th
 to Wednesday the 10
th
, the ship continued to burn.  Even days after 
the fire was quelled, the sections of the deck that remained above the waterline were too hot to 
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walk on.  This kept salvage and body retrieval crews off for approximately a week.  When they 
were able to access both the topside and underwater sections of the ship, the crews working to 
remove the bodies were in many cases, made up of the survivors.  Efforts to remove human 
remains were short-lived however, because soon afterward the conclusion was reached that not 
enough of the bodies could be identified to continue.  Approximately 900 bodies remained on the 
ship after the salvage.
143
   
In the year following the attack, salvage crews began work in Pearl Harbor.  Salvage was 
conducted first on the ships that could be repaired sufficiently to be placed back into service. The 
USS Arizona was determined, for obvious reasons, to be mainly unsalvageable, though there 
were sections that were removed from the superstructure.
144
  These included the ship’s fore and 
main masts, stern aircraft crane, the conning tower, all anti-aircraft guns including the 5-inch/51 
caliber, and 5-inch/25 caliber guns, the after turrets with their guns and ammunition, and what 
remained of turret two (see image 8).  The crews removing these items worked from a berth 
placed abreast of the ship’s remains (see image 9).145  Most of the items taken during this period 
were scrapped, although the two salvaged after turrets were slated for recycling as part of an 
island defense system.  The two turrets were divided up between the Pennsylvania and Arizona 
Batteries, located on the Northern shore of the island.  Construction was slow going at best; the 
Pennsylvania Battery was not completed until 1944.  While the Navy did organize the 
installation of motors at the Arizona Battery, the defense system there was never completed and 
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both the salvaged turrets and guns of the USS Arizona were scrapped, leaving only concrete 
holes where the Batteries resided.
146
   
The site of the USS Arizona wreckage was essentially left to rot until March 7
th
 1950, 
when the Commander of the Pacific Fleet, Admiral Arthur W. Radford, oversaw the erection of a 
flagpole on the site.  This was the first maintained memorial, as the flag had to be raised and 
lowered each day.  Eight years later, a bill was passed to allow the Navy to receive funds from 
the Pacific War Memorial Commissions to build a memorial for the USS Arizona.  In addition to 
the money provided by the commission, multiple fundraisers were held.  The most notable of 
these was Elvis Presley’s Pearl Harbor concert in 1961, which contributed $65,000 to the cause.  
The total cost of the memorial, less the visitor’s center (built 18 years later), was $500,000, and it 
took two years to build (see image 10).
147
   
Although the ship that lies in the deep mud of Pearl Harbor only spent a few short 
moments under attack, it shall forever be remembered for the monumental number of lives lost 
on December 7, 1941.  The men who shall spend eternity in the remains of the USS Arizona 
were, in many cases, the same who had traveled with her throughout the Atlantic and Pacific.  
The information presented within this chapter shows that the vessel currently lying in Pearl 
Harbor differs in many ways from the one that was built in the New York Shipyard in 1914.  By 
exploring the original construction of the ship, the technical improvements, and the attack and 
subsequent salvage, a better understanding of the Arizona can be achieved. The next chapter will 
include information pertaining to the current state of the wreck and the possible effects of the 
vessel on the surrounding environment
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Chapter 2: The Current State of the USS Arizona 
  
The wreckage that lies in the mud of Pearl Harbor does not represent the same ship 
originally built twenty-seven years prior to its sinking.  Because of significant technical 
improvements to the USS Arizona’s hull and superstructure, the ship that sank on December 7, 
1941 was much more heavily built than the original vessel.  Therefore, making an informed 
decision about the removal or remediation of the ship’s oil will first require a detailed analysis of 
the current hull condition and specifications.  Included in this chapter is the hull’s present 
condition, along with all of the collected corrosion and environmental data obtained from various 
studies.  Other well-documented case studies regarding corrosion and underwater defueling will 
then be compared to the information regarding the USS Arizona.  Combined, this will help to 
answer the following questions that form the basis of this thesis: is the USS Arizona in danger of 
imminent structural failure, and, what is the likely effect of hull deterioration to the surrounding 
environment? 
Seventy years after the attack on Pearl Harbor, problems are continuing to occur at the 
site.  In 1984, a visual study was conducted by the National Park Service to determine the hull’s 
condition.  This research is the basis for the current artistic representations of the ship. (see 
image 11).
148
   
Starting at the bow and moving aft, a diver at the site would see little damage until 
around frame 10, which is approximately 40 feet aft of the bow. Here, weather and forecastle 
decks are still present, as are portions of low-relief superstructure, such as deck fittings and 
fairleads.  Moving aft of frame 10, the damage quickly becomes apparent, in the form of jagged 
                                                 
148
 Lenihan ed., 81-95 
31 
 
and splayed metal.  Here, the deck elements previously seen in the undamaged area are generally 
indistinguishable from the blown apart decks and debris.
149
    
The No. 1 turret gunhouse and 14-inch gun tubes remain, although the structure sits 15 
feet lower than it would have prior to December 7 because of the collapse of the No. 2 bulkhead 
below it.  Surrounding the turret are remnants of teak decking and the forecastle deck.  The 
general lack of identifiable remains here is a direct result of the damage the ship sustained during 
the attack.  Despite this, there is also evidence of post-sinking human activity.  On the port side, 
near the No. 1 turret, an access hatch remains open that was likely opened by salvage divers 
directly after the sinking. Other than some hatch combings, very little of the main or forecastle 
decks remains in the blast zone.  This is mainly due to naval salvage efforts.
 150
    
Thirty feet aft of the beginning of the blast site at turret two, the torpedo blisters bulge 
from the starboard and port sides, and apparent evidence of the work of naval divers can be seen.  
Due to this, a majority of the side armor, from the torpedo blister to the gunnel, is missing.  
Documentation confirms that significant salvage activity occurred in this area because of 
dangerous metal overhanging the port side.  The kerf marks from the diver’s torches are 
apparent, and help to differentiate the sections that were cut away, from those damaged by the 
blast.
151
        
Damage continues past the primary blast site, although significantly less than in the 
previous area.  At two points, approximately 80 and 112 feet (24.38 and 34.14 meters) aft of the 
bow, two large cracks present themselves, and continue through the torpedo blister into the mud 
line.  According to Daniel Lenihan and Larry Murphy, these cracks likely represent major 
structural damage received during the Pearl Harbor attack, and subsequent sinking of the USS 
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Arizona.  These researchers also believe that the cracks extend into the armor belt and interior 
hull structures.
152
   
Midships, forward of the stack, the boat deck is missing due to salvage efforts.  This 
allows for visual identification of artifacts such as medicine cabinets, brackets, gaskets, and 
electrical fittings.  Continuing aft, the galley quickly becomes apparent.  This is another area of 
significant associated artifacts such as table legs, oven bottoms, the original tile flooring, and 
doorways.  Some items in this area though did not originate on the ship.  Deposited items such as 
leis and coins, and less intentional items such as sunglasses and cameras, can often be found in 
this area.
153
   
Moving underneath the present-day memorial, the ship is generally intact, with port 5-
inch gun barbettes still visible.  The majority of the damage seen aft of the monument is the 
result of salvage.  The teak decking previously surrounding the No. 3 turret has been removed, 
though mooring bitts remain.  Much like other areas of the ship previously described, multiple 
open ports, now encrusted with marine life, are found here.  Looking through the ports, one can 
see that a significant amount of silt is present within the ship.
154
     
Continuing aft, a bundled cable of unknown use runs along each of the gunnels.  
Although the cable was likely for degaussing the ship, this supposition is unconfirmed.  Also 
visible on the stern is the airplane catapult, and a large hole that extends into midships.  Opposite 
this hole, on the port side, are multiple portholes, many of which still have air trapped between 
the blackout covers and the glass.  The final evidence of battle damage is a small hole at the 
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starboard side of the fantail.  Here, the screw propellers are likely still present, although not 
visually apparent because of significant sediment infilling.
155
    
Similar to the visual study conducted years before, the USS Arizona Preservation Project, 
which began in 1998, was created as an interdisciplinary study of the deterioration and factors of 
corrosion for this historic ship.  The majority of the studies included within this project focus on 
the continuing corrosion of the hull, and the possibility of a catastrophic release of oil.
156
    
 As a part of the USS Arizona Preservation Project, in 2001, GPS datum points were 
placed on multiple areas of the ship, and labeled as superpoints 1-8.  Each of these superpoints 
was marked with a stainless steel bolt driven into the decking of the Arizona.  PVC pipes 
replaced these bolts in 2003 after they were found to have nearly disintegrated.  This caused 
minor precision problems, as the PVC points could not be placed directly on top of the remains 
of the stainless steel bolts, and were instead installed adjacent (see image 12).  The movement of 
the ship’s internal structures was monitored every few years by divers who would descend to 
obtain new GPS coordinates.  This is done by placing a tripod directly over a datum, which holds 
the GPS antennae out of the water.  The instrument height (HI) is then calculated prior to the 
data point being obtained.  In 2006, the datums were recorded using this methodology.  
Comparison of the 2003 results to the 2006 results established that the ship has made no 
discernible movement, and that the sediment holding the ship in place is stable and thoroughly 
compacted.
157
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After 70 years underwater, the ship has settled into 25 feet (7.62 meters) of mud.  This 
positioning is slowing the ship’s yearly decomposition rate on the port side from 0.087 mm 
(0.00343 inches) at 19.5 feet (5.94 meters), to 0.027 mm (0.00108 inches) under the mud line at 
26 feet (7.92 meters).  Corrosion rates above the mud line are variable though.  In general, 
deeper samples have lower corrosion rates, with the highest rate seen only 5 feet (1.52 meters) 
below the surface of the water on the port side.  At the time of the study, the originally half-inch 
thick plates here had been reduced to approximately 0.135 inches (3.43 mm), equivalent to a 73 
percent loss of steel thickness.  At 19.5 feet (5.94 meters) below the surface, however, the 
corrosion rates are significantly slower.  The original steel thickness here was 0.88 inches (22.2 
mm), but when this area was tested in 2002, the thickness had only decreased by approximately 
24 percent, for a hull thickness of 0.67 inches (17.04 mm).
 158
    
  Starboard side corrosion rates above the mud line were slower than those found on the 
port side because of the increased water movement on the port, caused by boat traffic and natural 
water flow.  At 5 feet (1.52 meters) below the surface the corrosion rate on the starboard side is 
0.127 mm (0.005 inches) resulting in a 2002 loss of .304 inches (7.72 mm) or 61 percent.  Much 
like the lowered corrosion rates at 19.5 feet (5.94 meters), at 15 feet below the surface on the 
starboard side the deterioration slows.  Here the corrosion rate is 0.035 mm (0.00139 inches).  
This equates to a 10 percent loss of 0.085 inches (2.16 mm) in the year 2002.
159
 
  Both the starboard and port side corrosion rates were acquired from four inch coupons 
cut from the hull using a hydraulic hole saw.  Careful precautions were taken to avoid oil-
containing compartments.  After the samples were removed, seven of the holes were plugged 
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with marine epoxy, while one hole was fitted with a removable plug to allow for water sampling 
in the future.
160
  
The pH of the water surrounding the ship is another factor that could indicate the amount 
of corrosion occurring on the USS Arizona.  Normal seawater pH ranges from 7.5-8.2 but in 
areas of active corrosion, this number can decrease to below 6.5.
161
  Surrounding the Arizona, the 
water was found to have a pH of between 7.6 and 9.1, with a mean of one standard deviation 
8.04 ± 0.15.  This means that the water around the wreck is basic, which explains a lessened rate 
of corrosion.
162
  The pH of the water inside the Arizona was found to be in a similar range to that 
surrounding the wreck.  The interior of the wreck displayed varying pH levels depending on the 
area of the wreck being tested.  Inside the second deck, the levels ranged from 7.05-9.36 with a 
7.69 average, while the third deck had an average of 8.01 and varied from 7.9-8.07.  The final 
area investigated was the No. 3 barbette near the first platform level.  This area had the highest 
average pH, ranging from 8.18-9.36 with an 8.41 average.
163
  The pH levels found on the ship 
correspond to the results found when the hull plates were investigated for corrosion.  According 
to the corrosion study, the highest rates of corrosion were found closest to the surface.
164
  The 
second deck was the area tested that was closest to the surface, and where the pH was found to 
be the lowest.  Despite this, the relatively high pH levels throughout the ship show low corrosion 
rates.   
While collection of current corrosion data is essential, the ability to extrapolate this 
information into the future is also necessary in a potentially hazardous situation such as that 
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presented by the USS Arizona.  To do this, a Finite Element Analysis (FEA) model was created, 
which mapped the stresses accrued since the sinking event. This process works by creating, “a 
computer-manipulated mathematical model that calculates theoretical stresses and shape changes 
in a structure under load using experimental variables based on observationally-derived data.”165   
 When working with FEA, as with any modeling system, the inclusion of more detail 
makes the model significantly more accurate.  For this reason, the FEA team decided to model 
only from frames 70-90—an 80-foot expanse in total (see image 13).  This section of the ship is 
aft of the main blast site, and was chosen because it was the forward-most section of the ship that 
was likely to have oil remaining within the bunkers, as well as areas affected by the explosion 
and subsequent burning.  According to the modeling team, this area provides a worst case 
scenario due to its proximity to the explosion, which had negatively affected the stability of the 
hull.
166
     
 After imputing the ship’s original pre-sinking stresses, the team extrapolated the data to 
the approximate years 1980, 2020, 2050, 2120, 2150, 2180, and 2240.  At each of these dates, 
the stresses accrued by the ship were confirmed to increase.  According to the 2020 model, at 
this point in the future, the deck plate and beams begin to sag, while the steel at the turn of the 
bilge is reaching its tensile strength.  Although their corrosion analysis data shows this occurring 
around the year 2020, this was actually the state of the ship as of 2009.  This means, at least in 
this one case, that the ship is deteriorating at a rate 11 years faster than the model predicts.
167
         
 The final model in this set was the year 2240.  According to the researchers, by this date, 
90 percent of the hull structure will have been lost to corrosion.  The superstructure decks, which 
have been slowly deteriorating up to this point, will collapse and fall into the third deck.  The 
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double bottom will also have buckled.  According to Foecke et al., however, the inner oil tanks 
holding the majority of the remaining fuel are, at this date in the future, still relatively intact.
168
   
 The data presented in the FEA model was painstakingly researched and detailed in many 
ways, though a potentially devastating problem still may lurk.  The researchers decided, because 
of the scale used, that fasteners would be too small to take into account.  Because of this, no 
rivets were included and the section was instead modeled as a single piece of steel stretching the 
entire 80 foot (24.38 meter) section from frames 70-90.  This assumption could significantly 
affect the model because it ignores the possibility of the hull plates separating in areas of high 
stress due to the deterioration of the corroded rivets.
 169
   
Steel wrecks have shown in multiple cases that among the first points to corrode are the 
rivets.  While investigating the Titanic, researchers found that the rivets and other fasteners 
displayed the highest levels of corrosion on the ship because these are areas of great mechanical 
stress.
170
  In addition to this, visual inspection of the 387-foot passenger liner S.S. Mohawk, 
which sank on January 25, 1935 in the waters off of New Jersey, showed significant 
deterioration of the rivets.  In many cases, the rivets had actually completely disintegrated (see 
image 14).
171
   
During a metallurgy study, samples of rivets and hull plating were taken both directly 
from the hull of the USS Arizona, and from the salvage remains that had been left in the water at 
Waipio Point.  The hull and rivet samples were studied to determine the rate at which corrosion 
was penetrating the steel.  While, on average, the three hull samples are corroding at a rate of 
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3.83 thousands of an inch, or mils per year (mpy) (0.097 mm), the heads of the rivets in the 
sample were corroding at a much higher rate.  These were found to be corroding at a rate of 5.3 
mpy (0.13 mm), resulting in an approximate total corrosion penetration of 271 mils (6.887 mm) 
in the 70 years since the sinking (see image 15).
172
  This deterioration is likely because of the 
riveting process used during the construction of the ship.  Rivets would be heated to red hot 
before being hammered into place, and quickly cooled.  This method caused significant 
deformation to the rivet heads, as well as decarburization, a process resulting from the heating of 
the rivets, which diffused carbon onto the surface of the metal, allowing it to corrode more 
quickly, and creating a layer of ferrite.
173
  Because of the increased level of corrosion occurring 
at the heads of the rivets, it is beneficial to include these in any model representing the corrosion 
rate of the USS Arizona.   
Hull failure at the USS Arizona site is an inevitability.  Because of this, the problems 
potentially surrounding a catastrophic hull failure must be acknowledged.  As mentioned in the 
introduction, continual monitoring stations have not been used since 1988 because of financial 
constraints.
174
  This forces the use of case studies to supplement the available data sources.  
To understand spills like that originating from the USS Arizona, the oil itself must be 
studied.  The 4,630 tons of oil carried within the USS Arizona at the time of the sinking is 
classified as Bunker C, also known as No. 6 oil.  Number 6 fuel is the residual oil left from the 
number 6 heavy petroleum distillation-boiling fraction process, which extracts distillate fuels and 
gasoline from the oil.
 175
  Because of this, No. 6 oil is designated as a residual fuel oil (RFO).
176
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This particular fuel contains higher levels of heavy carbon molecules, a density of 971 kg/m
3
 at 
20°C, and has a low-water soluble fraction (WSF) of <10 ppm.  This makes the oil itself difficult 
to work with because of its thickness and resistance to evaporation.
177
  Heavy carbon molecules 
also make the oil viscous, so it must be heated or combined with lighter fuels for use.
178
  After a 
spill of Bunker C oil, only 10 percent of the oil will evaporate, compared to a 75 percent 
evaporation rate for lighter fuels.
179
  
The polycyclic aromatic hydrocarbon (PAH) level in oils, such as that contained within 
the USS Arizona, helps to make the substance more biodegradable.  High levels of PAH allow 
the oil to undergo a weathering process called photo-oxidation.  After this process has occurred, 
the oil will be slightly broken down and more susceptible to dissolution in water than its crude 
oil counterparts.  While this process can be beneficial, it also allows the oil to reach the sediment 
below, where it can become tightly embedded and potentially very difficult to clean.
180
   
While the oil does become more water-soluble, the majority remains on the surface.  This 
is due to the heavier molecules impeding much of the oil from entering the water column.  
Because of this, the greatest danger from a spill of this type is the possibility of ingestion of oil 
by organisms living within or on top of the water.
 181
  Nearly every part of a contaminated marine 
animal can be affected in a number of different ways.  This includes, but is not limited to, the 
blood, eyes, skin, liver and mouth.  Possibly most devastatingly, the reproductive capabilities of 
the animal can be damaged, thereby affecting future generations.
182
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In 1999, the Erika sank thirty miles off the coast of France.  The effect of this sinking 
was a 20,000 ton spill of heavy fuel oil.  Making this spill worse was the winter storm that hit 
directly after the initial sinking, dramatically slowing the cleanup efforts.  Four hundred 
kilometers of the French coastline were devastated by the spill, which affected water birds and 
marine animals alike.  Due to the extensive damage, this spill was the most expensive in 
International Oil Pollution Compensation Funds history.  The amount of oil contamination in the 
water led to a ban on bivalve fishing and farming until 2001.
183
  By far, however, the most 
affected animal was a marine bird, Uria aalge, also known as the common guillemot.
184
  
Between 64,000 and 125,000 of these birds died within the first month of cleanup.  
Approximately one-third of these birds were less than one year old.
185
  This highlights the 
importance of a swift response to a spill of this nature. 
When cleanup efforts are quickly initiated for Bunker C oil spills, the results are 
significantly less detrimental to the environment.  This was shown following the 1988 sinking of 
the Nestucca.  The 230,000 gallon (870,644.71 liter) spill associated with the wreck was cleaned 
with oil absorbing pads and pom-poms.  Two years later, when the surrounding coastline was 
examined, only small amounts of the oil remained.
186
   This is similar to what might occur if the 
USS Arizona was to fail catastrophically.  The oil would likely be cleaned quickly because it is 
such a high profile wreck. 
 The sinking and emulsification of oil generally results from areas of high wave and tidal 
action because of the water based agitation in these areas.  Unemulsified No. 6 fuel oil has a 
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specific gravity of 0.95-1.03, while seawater’s specific gravity is 1.025.187  This means, typically, 
that this type of fuel oil floats on top of the water, although, because the specific gravities are 
similar, some of the oil could possibly begin to mix with the water column.  Emulsification 
continually increases the water content percentage, thus bringing the specific gravities even 
closer and promoting mixing.
188
  This, however, is not currently the case at the USS Arizona site. 
Between 2000 and 2001, researchers sampled sediment surrounding the wreckage to determine 
the effects of the oil.  The results showed that the oil was causing a negligible amount of damage 
during the test period.  On average, the samples showed 1.79 mg extractable material/g dry 
sediment.  This value was lower than the values for samples taken at other oil-contaminated 
sites, which ranged from 1.91-84.08 mg extractable material/g dry sediment.
189
  The low 
numbers seen at Pearl Harbor are most likely due to the previously mentioned PAH levels, and 
the generally low wave action seen within the protected fan-shaped harbor.
190
   
 The microbial presence around the USS Arizona is such that some of the leaking oil is 
being degraded.  Aerobic enrichment cultures were taken from the harbor’s sediment and 
inoculated with the oil leaking from the ship.  After 30 days, a sample of the oil taken from the 
ship had degraded 31.03 4.58 percent.  This was significantly higher than the degradation 
occurring in an uninoculated control sample, which only had a loss of 6.13 0.65 percent.  This 
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shows that the oil emanating from the wreckage is being partially degraded by the microbial 
activity surrounding the ship.
191
   
 The low rates of oil sedimentation that are seen surrounding the USS Arizona coincide 
with data taken from the ship’s leakage rates (see figure 1).  In 1998, efforts were initiated to 
determine the amount of oil emerging from the wreckage by collecting it from a single release 
site.  To complete this, a tent was constructed to collect the oil for a predetermined length of 
time.  The oil recovered from the tent was then measured, and a 24-hour release rate calculated.  
In 2003, the number of oil release sites measured was increased to two, and then increased again 
in 2006 to eight.  When values from all eight sites were combined, the ship was found to be 
leaking approximately 9 liters (9.5q) per day.
192
   
The leakage points throughout the ship were also tested for weathering.  The results of 
this showed that all leakage points except for those surrounding barbette #4 showed a decrease in 
n-alkanes, a result of weathering from the oil being exposed to seawater for 30 days or more.  
The oil resulting from near barbette #4, designated in Figure 5 by the aft most circle, and in 
Figure 2 by “Location A”, however, did not have depleted n-alkanes, and thus was likely 
originating from an original oil containment space.  A small decrease has been seen in this leak 
as a whole over the years though, hopefully indicating the oil leaking from the ship as a whole is 
mainly originating in secondary oil locations.
193
  
While current quantitative studies that specifically focus on the USS Arizona’s oil may be 
somewhat limited, vast amounts of qualitative evidence can be gained from photographs taken of 
the site, and from personal experiences.  Those who visit the Arizona invariably notice, and in 
many cases document, the oil emanating from the ship.  Despite this, to determine the possible 
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future problems that the wreck could endure, case studies of similar situations must be combined 
with the qualitative and quantitative evidence specifically associated with the USS Arizona. 
CASE STUDIES 
 While the USS Arizona’s oil leakage is high profile because of its historical importance, 
it is only one of many thousands of ships throughout the world that are leaking oil.  In 2010, this 
very issue took the forefront with the Deepwater Horizon disaster. The explosion occurring on 
April 20, 2010, created a spill releasing 35,000-60,000 barrels of oil per day from the ocean 
floor.
194
  Since each barrel is equivalent to 42 US gallons, this calculates to between 1,470,000 
and 2,520,000 gallons (5,564,555.32 and 9,539,237.7 liters) per day, vastly more than what is 
assumed to be contained within the entire Arizona wreck.
195
  Because of the far-reaching and 
devastating effects of this spill, the environmental impacts of oil have come to the attention of 
many Americans.  The following oil spill and defueling data were derived from case studies 
selected because of their circumstantial similarities to the USS Arizona.   
The first case study included here is the defueling of the Princess Kathleen.  The 
information from this shipwreck is comparable to that of the USS Arizona because, when the 
Princess Kathleen sank, not only was this ship carrying the same type of Bunker C oil, the ship 
has been underwater a similar amount of time.  Because of this, the theory behind some of the 
techniques used during the defueling process could be applied to the USS Arizona.
196
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The Royal Oak is another case that is very similar to the USS Arizona.  Much like the 
Arizona, this British warship is a military tomb originally containing over a thousand tons of oil.  
This wreck, however, was leaking significantly more than the Arizona.
 197  
While this is not the 
current situation of the historic Pearl Harbor shipwreck, it is important to use this case study as a 
warning of what could occur in the future, and how to mitigate public opinion.   
While the corrosion data for the USS Arizona concludes that the ship is relatively stable, 
situations may arise that cannot be accounted for.
198
  The most dangerous of these unpredictable 
elements is likely a storm.  The USS Mississinewa, which sank in the Ulithi Atoll in Micronesia, 
began significantly leaking oil after a particularly bad storm in 2001.
199
  Pearl Harbor could 
experience a similar storm, which would potentially affect the current stability of the hull.  By 
studying the USS Mississinewa case, a better understanding of this possible situation could be 
obtained.   
PRINCESS KATHLEEN 
 June 11, 2010 marked the final day of work on the Princess Kathleen site for Global 
Diving and Salvage, the company chosen to defuel this potentially hazardous ship.
200
  While this 
marked what would likely be one of the final significant dates in the history of this ship, its story 
had begun years before.  The Princess Kathleen was built in 1924 by the Scotland-based John 
Brown & Company, and was operated by the Canadian Pacific Railroad BC Coast Steamships.  
When built, she was 5,875 tons, 369 feet in length, and 60 feet in beam.  The majority of the 
vessel’s lifetime was spent serving as a luxury passenger ship on the British Columbian and 
                                                 
197
 Jacqueline Michel et al., "Potentially Polluting Wrecks in Marine Waters," proceedings of International Oil Spill 
Conference, 2005, accessed June 23, 2011, http://www.iosc.org/docs/IOSC_Issue_2005.pdf. 
198
 Foecke, 10. 
199
 U.S. Navy, U.S. Navy Salvage Report USS Mississinewa Oil Removal Operations, report no. S0300-B6-RPT-
010, May 2004, Introduction and Background, accessed June 25, 2011, 
http://www.essmnavy.net/Mississinewa%20Oil%20Removal%20Operations.pdf. 
200
 Global Diving and Salvage, Situation Report: As of 10:00am June 11, 2010, report no. 26, 1, accessed May 26, 
2010, http://www.dec.state.ak.us/spar/perp/response/sum_fy10/100216101/100216101_sr_26.pdf. 
45 
 
Southeast Alaskan Coasts.  Despite this, the ship briefly served as a troop transport during World 
War II.
201
  On September 7
th
, 1952 the Princess Kathleen was steaming near Juneau.
202
  
Although the ship did have radar, this was turned off at the time because the captain believed it 
was unnecessary.  He was mistaken, however, because the ship crashed into the rocks early that 
morning.  It was three and a half hours before assistance would arrive to help the 307 passengers 
and 80 crew members off the stranded ship (see image 16).
203
  Upon inspection, a tear was found 
in the hull that extended from the bottom to nearly midships.
204
  As the tide rose, it picked the 
ship up and slowly pulled it off the rocks, to where it still lies today.
205
   
 When divers working for Global Diving and Salvage descended on the wreck of the 
Princess Kathleen, they found it lying on the port side at an 80° list.  The ship had settled 134 
feet below the surface at the stern and 52 feet below at the bow.  The Princess Kathleen, which 
had lain on the bottom for nearly fifty years, had become a popular local diving spot.  However, 
as the sheening from the leaking oil became more prominent, the Coast Guard and the Alaska 
Department of Environmental Conservation decided that the ship had to be defueled.  The ship 
was estimated to contain approximately 155,000 gallons of Bunker C fuel.
206
 
 When the defueling project for the Princess Kathleen began, the first step was to clean 
the hull so that the ship could be examined.  Using what the dive teams referred to as “barney 
busters,” the hull was methodically revealed.  This process allowed ultrasonic thickness readings, 
which returned surprising results.  Much of the steel hull plating tested was still close to or 
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within the ship’s original specifications.  The rivets, on the other hand, were significantly 
deteriorated.  According to project manager Kerry Walsh, if the divers mistakenly hit one of the 
rivets with the barney buster, it would crumble.  This added logistical problems during pumping 
because positive pressure could burst the rivets and breech the ship’s oil tanks.207   
 During the original assessment, small holes were drilled into the tanks to determine the 
fuel-oil levels.  This survey showed that the cold water temperatures had stratified the oil, and 
the different components had separated to the top and bottom of the tank (see image 17).  This 
was problematic because the heavier components had settled to the bottom, creating an asphalt-
type sludge.
208
  Global Diving and Salvage bypassed this, and the problem of the oil’s thickness, 
by using a hot-tap (see image 18).  To perform this process, half-inch threaded holes were drilled 
into the hull of the ship and covered by a landing plate which had a flange and pipe welded to it.  
The four half-inch holes in the landing plate were lined up with the previously threaded ones, 
and used to bolt the plate to the hull (see image 19).  A valve was then attached to the pipe before 
the hot-tapping tool was secured to the flange.  The hot-tap extended a saw that bored a 4-inch 
hole through the hull before retracting back.  Once the valve was closed, the oil would not pour 
out, and the saw could be removed.  This had to be done three times for every tank.  The first 
hole was for the fuel extraction, the second for the recirculation of hot water, and the final 
provided a vent for the process.
209
   
 Once the holes were drilled into the oil tank, the defueling process began.  To do this, a 
pump was attached to the extraction hole, removing the oil to a portable 20,000 gallon 
(75,708.24 liter) tank on the surface.  This tank was half filled with water that had been intensely 
heated with a steam boiler.  The heated water was then recirculated back into the fuel tank so that 
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the amount of oil being removed was continually equal to the amount of water replacing it.  Once 
oil stopped emerging from the pumpline, the process was moved to the next tank.
210
 
 Both the USS Arizona and the Princess Kathleen were filled with Bunker C oil.  Because 
the water temperature in Hawaii is warmer than Alaska, the process of hot-tapping used on the 
Princess Kathleen would likely need to be modified to exclude the water heating if defueling 
was deemed necessary.  Despite this, the defueling method would be likely very similar to the 
hot-tapping process.  In addition, as previously mentioned, the heads of the rivets on the USS 
Arizona are corroding at a rate of 5.3 mpy (.13mm).
211
  Because of this, they are likely similar to 
the brittle rivets found on the Princess Kathleen.
212
 
 When the Princess Kathleen settled on the bottom, it did so lying on its port side.  
Although the divers could defuel the starboard side bottom tanks, thick mud made direct access 
to the port side wing tanks impossible.  To solve this problem, Global Diving and Salvage 
originally proposed digging tunnels through the mud to access the hull, a solution which could 
potentially destabilize the wreck.  Due to fortuitous events, blueprints from 1947 were found, 
which guided divers through the ship’s interior.  After the silt was dredged out, the interior 
hatches could be opened and the oil was removed.
213
   
 As it lies today in Pearl Harbor, the USS Arizona is sitting in approximately 25 feet (7.62 
meters) of mud.  The tanks currently containing oil are buried beneath the mud line and are 
located as follows: 30 bunkers on the first platform, which is located below the third deck, 34 
bunkers on the second platform, 28 bunkers in the hold, and 36 bunkers in the double bottom 
(see image 20).  Each of these bunkers is individually piped, which means that to remove the oil, 
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each of the tanks would need to be tapped independently.
214
  This makes the defueling of the 
battleship much more difficult than that of the Princess Kathleen.  Although blueprints exist that 
possibly indicate passageways to help divers penetrate the wreck and remove the oil internally, 
there are multiple reasons why this is likely not a realistic solution for the sunken battleship.  
A ROV investigation of the USS Arizona showed that access to the fuel tanks from inside 
the ship would necessitate the cutting of multiple internal structures.  No specific data are 
available to indicate how much sediment is contained within the areas of the ship where the ROV 
could not travel, but, in spaces that could be penetrated, the sediment levels were high.  Because 
of this, much like in the case of the Princess Kathleen, significant dredging would have to occur 
both internally and externally in order to defuel the vessel.  In addition to this, vital internal 
components would need to be reinforced to provide continued structural integrity to the ship.
215
   
After the USS Arizona sank, short-lived efforts were made to remove the bodies trapped 
within the ship.  In the end, however, approximately 900 bodies remained within the confines of 
the hull.  Since the ship sank, additional remains have been added to the wreck, as some 
survivors of the Arizona disaster wished to be cremated and interred back onto the ship they 
loved so well.  The remains, which continue to reside inside of the USS Arizona, make it not 
only a memorial, but also a war grave.
216
  The National Park Service believes that the human 
remains left on the wreck site have decomposed.
217
  This conclusion was reached due to the lack 
of remains identified by a mini-sub investigation in 2001, which penetrated the interior of the 
wreck.
 218
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However, on April 1, 2011, while Pearl Harbor was being dredged, a skull was found.   It 
is presently being dated to the 1940s.  Because of associated artifacts, many believe the remains 
came from a Japanese pilot who was shot down during the attack on Pearl Harbor.  No matter to 
whom the skull belonged, the fact that it was not deteriorated points toward the possibility of 
human remains still existing within the USS Arizona.
219
  Human remains significantly older than 
those possibly existing on the USS Arizona have also been located.  In 2006, remains believed to 
be 10,000 years old were found in a submerged saltwater cave along Mexico’s Yucatán 
Peninsula.
220
  In addition to this, a case study involving submerged pig carcasses showed that 
very little animal based decomposition was seen in areas of low oxygen.
221
  Research into the 
water composition within the USS Arizona concluded that the oxygen content in the wreck was 
lower than that in the surrounding harbor.  As the researchers moved deeper in to the recesses of 
the wreck, the oxygen content continued to decrease.  In internal areas of the ship that did not 
receive active seawater exchange, the dissolved oxygen rate was nearly zero.
222
 
 As previously mentioned, the pH in the various internal areas of the USS Arizona ranged 
from 7.05-9.36.
223
  Very few studies have been conducted on the effects of pH on human 
remains.  Despite this, Angi Christensen and Sarah Meyers investigated further into this very 
subject.  Bovine bones were placed into solutions containing pH levels of 1, 4, 7, 10, and 14, and 
studied over the course of a year.  While the acidic solutions negatively affected the bones fairly 
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quickly, the neutral and more basic solutions, up to pH 10, were found to have the highest levels 
of preservation.  In the neutral pH 7 solution, the tissue slowly detached from the bone, and after 
one year, the bone itself was in good condition with soft adipocere still retained within the 
marrow areas of the bones.  The bones in the pH 10 solution were even better preserved.  After 
one year, some soft tissue still remained within the solution, and hard adipocere was found both 
on the outer portion of the bone and within the marrow cavity.
224
  This study reinforces that the 
pH of the water surrounding the Arizona could support the presence of human remains within the 
USS Arizona.   
Regardless of the presence or absence of physical remains, the status of the wreck as a 
war grave remains unchanged.  The public’s strong feelings toward the sacredness of the site are 
not as connected to physical remains, as to the emotions that the Pearl Harbor site evokes.  Most 
believe the USS Arizona should not be modified in anyway.  Because of this, if the oil was slated 
for removal, the public would need to be informed of exactly why and how this is happening.  
This is what was done for the Princess Kathleen site, with excellent results.  Although the 
Princess Kathleen is not applicable for memorial status, the public was educated as to the 
specifics of the defueling process.  On this project, before work of any kind was performed by 
Global Diving and Salvage, an open house was arranged by the Coast Guard.  Here they 
displayed ROV photos of the wreckage and images showing the oil sheening.  Once the public 
was better informed, no one opposed the removal.  After Global Diving and Salvage conducted 
an assessment of the ship, another open house was arranged, this time including an informative 
video entitled the “Saga of the Princess Kathleen.”  This short film focused on the ship and the 
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work conducted to remove the oil.
225
  By keeping the public informed as to the defueling 
progress, those who may protest the removal were given a forum to express their concerns.  Most 
importantly, however, the open house allows the public to feel as though they are part of the 
process, rather than detached.  Interestingly, in this case, the public felt such a connection with 
the project after the defueling was completed, that it was decided to leave the landing plates 
attached to the hull of the ship. Citizens interested in the project felt as though this process had 
become part of the ship’s history and should thus be remembered as part of its evolution.226   
It is apparent that any defueling project undertaken on the USS Arizona would have 
considerably more public image problems to contend with than did the Princess Kathleen.  
Despite this, the process of full disclosure with the public could potentially ease the tension.  As 
was done in Alaska, informing all interested parties of exactly what was occurring on the historic 
wreck, and why, could allow citizens to feel as though they were participating in the decision 
concerning the ship.   
ROYAL OAK 
 The first British warship to be lost in World War II was the Royal Oak.  She sank on 
October 14, 1939 when the submarine U-47 found its way into the Scapa Flow home fleet base.  
Three torpedoes were shot into the battleship’s hull, sinking it in less than 15 minutes (see image 
21).  Of the 1208 crew members, only 375 survived the sinking.  When the ship sank, it was 
carrying approximately 3,000 tons of oil.  The remaining oil leaked at a steady rate from the ship 
through hull breaches until the early 1990s.  The ship’s condition changed, however, in 1996 
when oil was found in the surrounding Orkney beaches.  Upon investigation, oil leakage from 
the wreck was found to have vastly increased from 100 liters (26.42 gallons) per day to 300-500 
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liters (79.25-132.09 gallons) per day.  This equates to 1.5 tons of oil per week.  In 2000, it was 
determined that 96 percent of the total amount of oil in UK waters had originated from the Royal 
Oak.
227
         
 The site of the HMS Royal Oak is the largest official British war tomb.  Much like the 
USS Arizona, this made defueling the ship controversial, with the Ministry of Defense reluctant 
to disturb the wreck.  Multiple fisheries and local wildlife however, were in danger of being 
affected by the oil loss.  Because of this, the local authorities in Orkney threatened legal action 
against the Ministry of Defense.  This led the Ministry to conduct an extensive environmental 
study, influencing the decision to remove the oil.
228
   
 Prior to the defueling of the Royal Oak, several remediation efforts were attempted, all of 
which ultimately failed.  Metal plates and sandbags were ineffectively secured to the hull in an 
attempt to quell the oil release.  A much pricier option was a $300,000 stainless steel umbrella 
placed over the leaking wreck.  The tidal action at the site made this remediation effort also 
inadequate.  The Orkney region initiated the final action on the site before the defueling was 
undertaken.  Large oil absorbing booms were attached to a fish cage anchored above the wreck.  
While each of these methods may have been temporarily helpful, they were not found to be long-
term solutions.  In 2001, at the cost of many millions of dollars, the Royal Oak was defueled.  
Using the hot-tap method also utilized on the Princess Kathleen, each of the fuel tanks was 
attached to a one-way valve to remove the oil.  After the process was concluded, 1,500 tons of 
oil were still estimated to remain beyond reach within the ship.
229
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 Many similarities exist between the case of the Royal Oak and the USS Arizona.  Both of 
these historic wrecks are the gravesites for hundreds of sailors.
230
  This obviously affects the 
defueling measures the government is willing to take.  The difference in the situation of the two 
ships, however, is in the issue of the amount of oil being lost on a daily basis.  The Royal Oak 
was leaking more than ten times more oil each day than is the bleeding Pearl Harbor 
battleship.
231
  While this is not the situation currently, it is possible that this rate of loss is the 
future for the Arizona.  If this becomes the case, the Royal Oak study could be crucial to a full 
understanding of the situation. 
USS MISSISSINEWA  
 On November 20, 1944 in Micronesia, a Japanese suicide torpedo called a Kaiten struck 
the USS Mississinewa, an American oiler (see image 22).  After burning from the 3,418 pound 
warhead explosion, the Mississinewa sank, with 63 U.S. sailors onboard.
232
  The ship was 553 
feet long and totaled 24,425 tons.  It sank upside down in 130 feet of water, and remained there 
until it was rediscovered by sport divers in 2001.
233
  In July of the same year, a storm ripped 
through the area and destabilized the wreck.  Suddenly, sheening began to appear in the 
surrounding waters of the lagoon.  After a multi-disciplinary study of the ship’s structure, it was 
found to be leaking in excess of 1,000 liters (264.17 gallons) per day.
234
   
 Remediation efforts came into play after the primary leaking event.  In 2002, the United 
States paid $4,000,000 to patch the USS Mississinewa’s leakage points, thereby temporarily 
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sealing in the 18,000,000 liters (4,755,96.94 gallons) of oil remaining on the ship.
 235
  To do this, 
multiple operations had to take place.  A four-inch pipe leaking from the valve was capped and 
installed with a new blanking flange.  Another larger 12-inch pipe was found to be leaking, and 
was also plugged.  A patch was utilized when a 24-inch long crack was found traversing the hull 
plating at the #3 wing tank on the starboard side.  Lastly, after seven oil tanks were sampled and 
plugged, 3,400 gallons (12,870 liters) of oil and 7,400 gallons (28,012 liters) of oil-contaminated 
seawater were removed from the wreck.
236
  
From January 28 to March 1, 2003, approximately one year after the efforts to patch the 
wreck, defueling was successfully completed on the Mississinewa. To gain access to the internal 
tanks, Broco® ultrathermic rods were used to cut an area from the hull large enough to allow 
diver access.
237
 In total, approximately 1.8 million gallons (6,813,741.21 liters) were removed 
from the inner and outer tanks of the wreck.  This equates to a removal of 99 percent of the 
original fuel oil supply during this operation.  Oil removed from the wreck was then transported 
to Singapore to be sold.  The oil profits were recycled into the defueling project to offset some of 
the operational costs.
238
    
 As previously mentioned, the USS Mississinewa is the gravesite of sixty-three sailors.  
Similar to what would likely occur on the USS Arizona, multiple public relation problems arose 
due to the disruption of the site.  Because of this, the United States pledged to work only in areas 
that would have been unmanned at the time of the sinking.  This could be done because the ship 
had settled upside down.  Despite the 80-112 foot (24.38-36.14 meter) depths of the wreck, the 
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defueling process was relatively simple.  In total, twenty-three tanks were hot-tapped to remove 
the oil from the ship.
239
   
 The FEA model for the USS Arizona identifies the stresses that have accumulated since 
the sinking, and that will continue until the predicted hull corruption in 2240.
240
  This model, 
however, does not account for the high probability overtime of a storm affecting the USS 
Arizona’s stability.  It is possible, much like the USS Mississinewa, that the Arizona could suffer 
from a significant environmental incident, thereby greatly increasing its leakage rate.   
 The way in which the oil was removed from the wreck of the Mississinewa may not be 
applicable to the work that may be required on the USS Arizona, due to the inverted positioning 
of the Mississinewa.
241
  Nevertheless, aspects of the Mississinewa defueling can be used to 
achieve a result best suited for Pearl Harbor.  Because the situation at Pearl Harbor is not deemed 
urgent due to the relative stability of the ship, it may be possible to utilize the patch strategies 
originally used on the Mississinewa.  While this was only a temporary fix for this ship because of 
its high leakage rate, it may be a possibility for the slowly leaking Arizona. If a patch did not 
work and a situation occurred that forced oil removal, the cost of the process could be potentially 
offset by selling the oil, much like in the situation of the Mississinewa.
242
   
 Each of these case studies is comparable to situations that the USS Arizona may 
encounter over time.  By combining these similar wreckage events with the data taken 
specifically from the USS Arizona, it is possible to create a more complete picture of the ship at 
this time and into the future.  If a catastrophic situation were to occur with the USS Arizona, it is 
possible that studying the cases presented here could provide a more positive outcome.  More 
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importantly though, all of this information is beneficial to assist in the decision of whether or not 
the USS Arizona’s oil should be removed or remediated, a conclusion which will be further 
investigated in the following chapter.  
  
 
Chapter 3: The Potential Future of the USS Arizona 
 
 While the previous chapters have focused on the history of the USS Arizona, the data 
surrounding its corrosion, and how the Arizona relates to similar wrecks, this chapter will 
theorize a possible future of the site.  To do this, the best and worst case scenarios surrounding 
the ship’s inevitable collapse will be examined in detail.  These will be created by extending the 
current data focused on the USS Arizona into the future, including information that could 
potentially harm or benefit the wreck.   
 In 2002, a detailed corrosion study was conducted on the USS Arizona, both above and 
below the mud line.  Corrosion rate measurements from the port side were taken at 5 feet (1.52 
meters), 19.5 feet (5.94 meters), 26 feet (7.92 meters), and 34 feet (10.36 meters) below the 
surface of the water.  The starboard side rates are not included here, as the port side rates are 
generally higher.  The highest corrosion rates were found 5 feet (1.52 meters) below the surface.  
Here, the ship corrodes at a rate of approximately 0.15 mm (0.00598 inches) per year.  The 
ship’s original hull thickness here was 0.5 inches (12.7 mm).  This corrosion rate would account 
for a loss of 0.425 inches (10.80 mm), or 85 percent loss of the hull structure as of the year 2012.  
According to these data, a 90 percent loss in this area is expected to occur as early as the year 
2016.
243
   
At the deeper point of 19.5 feet (5.94 meters), the ship’s corrosion rates slowed 
significantly.  Here, the steel was corroding at a rate of 0.08 mm (0.00343 inches) per year.  As 
of 2012, the ship would have lost 0.24 inches (6.10 mm), for a current hull thickness of 0.66 
inches (16.76 mm).  This would equate to a current (2012) loss of 27 percent from the original 
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0.9 inch (22.86 mm) hull thickness.  In the year 2177, the hull will theoretically be reduced to 
0.09 inches (2.29 mm), which equates to a 90 percent hull thickness loss.
244
  
At 26 feet (9.92) below the surface, the corrosion rate again slows, although not as 
dramatically.  This depth displayed a loss of 0.025 mm (0.00108 inches) per year.  As of 2012, 
the ship has lost 0.077 inches (1.96 mm), for a current hull thickness of 0.423 inches (10.74).  
This equates to only a 15 percent loss of hull thickness.  According to this research, a 90 percent 
hull thickness loss at 26 feet (9.92 meters) would occur in the approximate year 2358, 417 years 
after the attack at Pearl Harbor.
 245
   
The final depth included in the port side corrosion study was 34 feet (10.36 meters).  
Here, the metal was corroding at a very similar rate as the metal at 26 feet (9.92 meters).  The 
corrosion rate at 34 feet (10.36 meters) is 0.00110 inches (0.028 mm).  This equals a 2012 
thickness of .0547 inches (13.89 mm), or a 12 percent loss since the sinking.  When extrapolated, 
this would show a 90 percent loss of hull structure at this depth in the year 2452
246
 
The previous chapter introduced a finite element analysis (FEA) model that stated the 
USS Arizona would slowly lose its structural integrity until approximately the year 2240, by 
which time the ship would have lost 90 percent of its hull structure.  The data to create the FEA 
model were meticulously gathered and entered to create what the researchers hoped would be a 
very accurate view into the future of the Arizona.  As the previous chapter explains however, this 
is likely to be a best case scenario.  The FEA model presents the 80-foot expanse that was 
studied as a solid piece of steel, instead of riveted as it actually is.  As previously shown, in many 
cases the rivets are the first areas to corrode on steel-hulled ships.
247
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The data presented by the FEA model do not consistently match the data from the 
corrosion study when extrapolated into the future (see image 23).  According to the corrosion 
study, 90 percent of the uppermost areas of the ship, which lie only 5 feet (1.52 meters) below 
the surface, will be lost by 2016.
248
  In contrast, the FEA model predicts the significantly more 
optimistic occurrence of corrosion of the upper decks between the years 2120 and 2180.
249
  
Another example of more conservative corrosion rates than the FEA model was at 19.5 feet (5.94 
meters) below the surface.  According to the FEA model, even in the year 2240, when the ship is 
projected to have lost approximately 90 percent of its structure, i.e. internal and external 
components of the ship, the hull is still fairly intact at approximately 19.5 feet (5.94 meters) 
below the surface.
250
  When extrapolated, however, the corrosion rates taken from the Arizona 
show a 90 percent loss of hull structure at this point in the approximate year 2177.
251
  The FEA 
model prediction ends at 2240, by which year the researchers propose that the USS Arizona will 
have lost 90 percent of its total hull structure.  Because of this, it is not possible to conclude 
when the model proposes the 90 percent loss at depths of 26 and 34 feet (9.92 and 10.36 meters) 
below the surface will occur, because in the year 2240 these areas are theoretically still fairly 
intact.  Despite this, the FEA model predicts that by the year 2240, the double bottom will have 
collapsed, although the interior of the wreck will remain.
252
 This difference in rates possibly 
reflects the fact that the corrosion data is taken purely from the hull, while the FEA model 
represents data from throughout the exterior and interior of the ship.  In addition, the FEA model 
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was created in a near monolith style, where some of the individual pieces of the wreck were 
modeled as singular pieces.
253
  
Best Case Scenario 
To create a best case scenario for the USS Arizona, multiple aspects of the ship’s 
deterioration must be taken into account.  Although corrosion data from the wreckage shows that 
sections near the surface could lose 90 percent of their hull structure as early as 2016, lower 
areas show slower levels of deterioration, losing 90 percent between the years 2177 and 2452.
254
  
Therefore, certain aspects of the wreckage could prolong the amount of time that the Arizona 
would remain structurally sound.  These will be included here within the best case scenario. 
When the USS Arizona sank on December 7
th
 1941, it did so vertically, and into 
approximately 25 feet of mud.  The positioning of this wreck now assists in its stability.  While 
ships that sink in an inverted position are the most stable, those that sit on their sides corrode the 
quickest.  This is because the structure of the ship was not engineered to support its own weight 
in that manner.  Sinking in an upright position prevents undue stress on the hull, which should 
allow the wreck to persist longer than if it had settled on its side.
255
   
According to John Riley, a diver who was well-respected by the maritime archaeological 
community for his knowledge of steel wrecks, ships that sink in an upright manner tend to bury 
themselves into soft bottoms such as sand or mud, up to what would have been the ship’s 
previous waterline.
256
  This holds true for the USS Arizona.  The wreck lies in approximately 30 
feet of water and 25 feet (7.62 meters) of mud.  Originally, the Arizona had a draft of 28 feet 10 
inches (7.87 meters). This would mean that the Arizona followed the waterline theory and sank 
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into the harbor floor to its approximate previous waterline.
257
  The rate of corrosion of the 
Arizona is greatly slowed by the amount of mud in which it is sitting.
258
 
Riley’s theories do not pertain only to the sinking patterns of ships.  He also covers how 
corrosion is most likely to occur after the ship sinks.  According to Riley, when a ship has settled 
to its previous waterline, the decking begins to corrode away.
259
  This is currently what is 
occurring on the Arizona, where the highest level of corrosion is found on the decking, only 5 
feet (1.52 meters) below the surface of the water.
260
  Riley also states that as the decking is 
corroded, the hull sides will peel away from the wreck in areas where the ship is not 
bulkheaded.
261
  The fact that the USS Arizona is heavily bulkheaded throughout, should assist in 
holding the sides of the ship together more securely than would occur if the interior was lacking 
this important structural component.
262
  Riley’s theory on corrosion patterns concludes with his 
observation of several heavily corroded ships.  According to this theory, when ships do finally 
lose their sides, the bow, stern, and machinery tend to remain.
263
  Although this is not the current 
state of the USS Arizona, this conclusion points toward remnants surviving long after the 
majority of the hull has been lost.  
The fact that the USS Arizona sank in the fairly protected area of Pearl Harbor also lends 
heavily to its slowed level of corrosion.  Research into the deterioration of shipwrecks 
throughout the world has revealed one of the most important variables to be the amount of water 
movement surrounding the wreckage.  This became apparent when shipwrecks near each other 
showed similar levels of corrosion.  Examples of this are the wreckage sites in Scapa Flow and 
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Truk Lagoon.  Both of these areas are famous for their well-preserved groups of wrecks.  
Jacqueline Piero, in her master’s corrosion study, proposes that this is because of the nature of 
the areas where the ships wrecked.  These areas are well sheltered by landmasses and have calm 
water.
264
  As presented in the previous chapter, the USS Arizona is also protected in a calm fan-
shaped harbor.
265
  According to the data presented by the Truk Lagoon and Scapa Flow studies, 
the USS Arizona’s rate of natural corrosion should have been slowed by reduced aquatic 
abrasion due to the generally calm water.   
The lack of excessive movement in the harbor is not the only aspect of the water that is 
assisting in the USS Arizona’s stability.  The average water temperature surrounding the 
Honolulu, Oahu, area is 78.2°F (25.7°C).
266
  In general, warm water increases the level of 
corrosion at a site.  For water with any given oxygen concentration, the corrosion rate tends to 
double for every 55°F (30°C) increase in temperature.
267
 While this relatively warm water does 
generally increase the speed of corrosion, it also helps create more concretions on the surface of 
the steel.  Concretions or other biofouling agents create barriers that prevent oxygen and ion 
migration, which would depolarize anodic areas.
268
  In addition to adding a barrier between the 
ship and agents that would corrode the hull, organisms that attach to the hull also help to support 
it.  These organisms encrust the surface of the USS Arizona, providing it with added rigidity and 
strength that it may have lacked otherwise.
269
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While concretions and biofouling agents can be beneficial to the preservation of the USS 
Arizona’s hull, sulfate reducers and methanogenic bacteria can live within mud and concretions 
and eat away at metal hulled ships.  In a case where these bacteria are acting upon a ship, the 
amount of corrosion caused is proportional to the amount of bacteria present.  The small amount 
of corrosion found at and below the mud line on the USS Arizona suggests that these bacterial 
agents are either minimal or non-existent.
270
  This is likely because of the anti-fouling paint on 
the hull below the waterline.
271
   
The mud surrounding the USS Arizona is also helping the wreck survive in another way.  
When wrecks sink into softer materials such as mud or sand, they are well supported.  Mud 
works as a cushion to protect the wreck from a multitude of environmental factors, such as 
inclement weather or wave action.  Ships found in rocky environments can easily be tossed and 
broken on the hard bottom.
272
   
Although the rivets on the USS Arizona will inevitably deteriorate to the point of 
structural failure, the mud may possibly assist in holding the ship together.  While the areas 
above the mud line would collapse outwardly, the hull plating below the mud line would likely 
be held secure.  This is reinforced by the GPS data taken from the USS Arizona, which shows 
that the wreckage is stable and has made no discernible movement.
273
  In addition to this, 
although no data are currently available on the corrosion rate of the rivets below the mud line, 
logically, these would be expected also to be corroding at a slower rate.  The loss of hull plating 
above the mud line would be detrimental to the stability of the hull.  It should be kept in mind 
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however, in the case of the oil tanks, that since all of the tanks are currently below the mud line, 
the majority of the oil would still be contained.
274
   
Also assisting in the retention of the hull stability is its lack of superstructure.
275
  In the 
years following the sinking of the Arizona, much of the ship’s superstructure, including the fore 
and main masts, stern aircraft crane, conning tower, all anti-aircraft guns including the 5-inch/51 
caliber, and 5-inch/25 caliber guns, the after turrets with their guns and ammunition, and what 
remained of turret two, were removed to be used elsewhere.
276
 Although the original reason 
behind the removal of the ship’s superstructure was not weight reduction, the lack of weight has 
lessened the pressure on the fragile decking.  Currently, the deck is corroding at a rate of 0.15 
mm (0.00598 inches) per year.
277
  Had the ship’s superstructure been retained, the deck beams 
would likely have already collapsed inward, as the weakened metal would not be sufficient to 
hold up the weight.  
When the current corrosion rates are extrapolated out to a 90 percent loss of hull 
structure, the greatest fear, beyond the loss of the historic wreck, is the potential outpouring of 
thousands of gallons of oil.  As previously addressed, the areas of the wreck closest to the 
surface will degrade first, in the year 2016 approximately.  This could potentially increase the oil 
leakage rate since the oil that is currently pooling within the wreck would more quickly reach the 
surface.  At 19.5 feet below the surface, however, the corrosion rate is significantly slowed.  
Here, it is estimated that 90 percent of the hull structure will be lost by 2177.
278
  Although it is 
unlikely, if the ship were to release the remaining oil in the year 2177, it would expel between 
356,664.5 and 456,664.5 gallons (1,350,122 and 1,728,663.18 liters) into the small harbor.  This 
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was determined by extrapolating the 9 liters per day (2.38 gallon) leakage rate out to one year, 
then multiplying this by 165 (which is the number of years from 2012 to 2177), then subtracting 
that value from the estimated amount retained within the Arizona today, which is between 
500,000 and 600,000 gallons (1,892,705.89 and 2,271247.07 liters).
279
  Although by this point in 
the future the ship would have lost approximately 143,335.5 gallons (542,583.9), this amount of 
oil is still quite significant and could be potentially devastating if not cleaned quickly.  
Thankfully, though, it is unlikely that the totality of the remaining oil would be released at this 
time, even if the hull in this area were to catastrophically fail. 
The lower areas under the mud line, where the vast majority of the oil resides, are 
corroding at the slowest rate.  According to corrosion rates, at 26 feet (9.92 meters) below the 
surface, the ship will lose 90 percent of its hull structure by the year 2358, while 90 percent will 
be lost at 34 feet (10.36 meters) in the approximate year 2452.  In the year 2358, the USS 
Arizona will still have between 202,035.9 and 302,035.9 gallons (764,789.08 and 1,143,330.26 
liters) remaining.  When the ship at 34 feet (10.36 meters) is predicted to reach 90 percent 
corrosion, the ship will still contain approximately between 117,772 and 217,772 gallons 
(445,815.52 and 824,356.7 liters).  Again, this was conservatively determined by multiplying the 
Arizona’s daily leakage rate by 365 days and then multiplying that number by either 343 or 440, 
which is the numbers of years between 2012 and 2391, and 2012 and 2452 respectively.  This 
product was then subtracted from the estimated amount of oil in the ship now.
280
  While this total 
is approximately a third of the estimated amount held today, it is still a large amount of oil that 
would need to be quickly cleaned to avoid damage to the harbor.   
                                                 
279
 Ibid; Russell and Murphy, “Long-Term Monitoring”, 408-466. 
280
 Ibid. 
66 
 
Currently the contingency plan for an oil spill in Pearl Harbor includes oil-absorbing 
materials, booms, and skimmers.  All of these would be used in the event of a significant spill 
from the USS Arizona.  Oil-absorbing booms would also be placed at the mouth of Pearl Harbor 
to prevent the oil from reaching the ocean or nearby wetlands that house a multitude of 
endangered birds.
281
  As mentioned in the previous chapter, the Nestucca sank in 1988 in the 
Pacific Ocean, releasing 230,000 gallons (870 644.7 liters) of oil that contaminated coastal areas 
of both Washington and Vancouver.  The spill was quickly addressed with the use of oil-
absorbing pads and pom-poms.  Because of factors that included the rapid response, little 
evidence of the oil remained when the areas were studied in 1990.
282
  The USS Arizona 
Memorial is an emotionally charged site, with plans in place to quickly remediate any problems 
should a failure occur.
283
    
When the eventual collapse of the wreckage does occur, this possibly will not mean the 
end of the Pearl Harbor Memorial.  As a hull degrades, the artifacts tend to fall into the 
remaining structure of the wreckage, thus keeping the associated items together.
284
  The lack of 
significant water movement would also assist in keeping the artifacts together.  While the USS 
Arizona Memorial would not be the same as it was in the past, or is currently, it would continue 
to be an organic and ever-changing representation of the tragedy of the Arizona disaster, and 
Pearl Harbor attack as a whole.   
Worst Case Scenario 
                                                 
281
 SAPA, "60 Years On, Divers Scout the USS Arizona," Http://www.news24.com/xArchive/Archive/60-years-on-
divers-scout-the-USS-Arizona-20010623, June 23, 2001, accessed February 25, 2012, News 24. 
282
 Graham, 302. 
283
 SAPA, “60 Years On”. 
284
 Iron Ships and Steam Shipwrecks: Papers From the First Australian Seminar on the Management of Iron Vessels 
and Steam Shipwrecks. by The Western Australian Maritime Museum. Perth, Australia. 
67 
 
While a best case scenario is obviously the most comforting option, potentially more 
useful information can be derived from examining the USS Arizona in a more hazardous 
situation.  This could be an event ranging from premature failure of the steel to a storm ripping 
through the harbor.  Multiple scenarios will be presented here that could negatively affect the 
current stability of the USS Arizona.   
When the USS Arizona was bombed near the No. 2 turret, the ship exploded and began to 
burn.  The ship then continued to burn for three days, until December 10
th
 1941.
285
  When steel is 
exposed to temperatures in excess of 932°F (500°C), the strength of the metal is decreased by 
approximately 40 percent.  In comparison, fires in steel buildings can reach temperatures in 
excess of 1,800°F (982°C).
286
  Although the heat of the fire that burned through the Arizona is 
unknown, it burned for three days, making weakening of the steel a significant factor.
287
  
Because of this, the ship could possibly fail before the predicted 90 percent hull loss because of 
the fire-weakened steel.   
In addition, the method used to harden the rivets of the Arizona immediately lowered 
both their tensile and fatigue strengths, when compared to unheated attachment methods such as 
bolts.
288
  Riveting also lowers the steel’s ductility, making it more brittle.  Each year, the rivet 
shafts are losing 2.1 mils per year (mpy) (0.053 mm), while the heads of the rivets lose the much 
higher amount of 5.3 mpy (0.135 mm).  When compared to the hull plating, the rivet shafts are 
corroding at a rate between the 19.5 foot (5.94 meter) corrosion rate, and the 26-34 foot (7.92- 
10.36 meter) corrosion rate.  In contrast, the heads of the rivets are corroding at a rate nearly 
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comparable to the rate of corrosion on the Arizona’s hull only 5 feet (1.52 meters) below the 
surface.  This would equate to a .371 inch (9.4 mm) loss at the head of the rivet, and a .147 inch 
(3.73 mm) loss on the shaft since the sinking.
289
   
Currently, no information exists for the original dimensions of the rivets used on the USS 
Arizona, but scaled photos taken in 2009 show the widest portion of the shaft to be 
approximately 1 inch (25.4 mm), while the narrowest area was only .75 inches (19.05 mm). (see 
image 15)  The head of the rivet is widest at approximately 1.75 inches (44.45 mm), though it 
narrows at the top to slightly under an inch.  By reversing the corrosion rate, the shaft can be 
assumed to have been originally 1.14 inches (28.96 mm), with the narrow section likely due to 
corrosion, while the head ranged from 2.1 inches (53.34 mm) at the widest, to 1.2 (30.48 mm) 
inches near the top of the head.  Assuming that the corrosion rate of the rivets is going to 
continue at a steady rate, this would mean that the wide portion of the shaft of the rivet would 
lose approximately 60 percent of its structure by the year 2266, while the narrow section, if it is 
representative of the Arizona’s rivets as a whole, would lose 60 percent by the year 2195.  The 
rivet head would lose this same percentage in the year 2178 for the thick flange portion, and in 
the year 2076 for the thinner section of the head.  These approximate years were found by 
multiplying the perceived original thicknesses of the different areas of the rivets by .6 (60 
percent).  This number was then divided by the corrosion rate, which equaled the number of 
years required to achieve a 60 percent loss.  Lastly, the number of years was then added to 1941, 
the year of the sinking.
290
  Sixty percent was chosen, in this case, instead of 90 percent because 
of the amount of stress that is put on the rivets.  This pressure could cause the rivets to shear off 
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at a lower point of structural failure than would be expected for the larger hull plating if a 
significant event such as a storm occurred. 
Pearl Harbor—and Hawaii in general—when compared to other coastal areas, is fairly 
protected from hurricanes. The Central Pacific Hurricane Center (CPHC) identifies storms 
between the Longitudes of 140°W and 180°, and warns the Hawaiian Islands when necessary.  
Dangerous weather on the islands include gale force winds (39-54 mph), tropical storm force 
winds (cyclonic winds 39-73 mph), and hurricane force winds (74 mph or greater).  Five levels 
of hurricanes are recognized, with the weakest storm considered a hurricane having winds 
ranging from 74-95 mph; this is referred to as a category 1.  A category 2 has winds ranging 
from 96-110 mph, while a category 3 has 111-130 mph winds.  The winds in a category 4 storm 
start at 131 and go to 155 mph.  Anything above 155 mph is a category 5.  Categories 3-5 are all 
considered major storms.
291
     
Although the warm water surrounding the Hawaiian Islands could potentially support at 
least a category 4 hurricane, these rarely occur near the islands.  This is because of the Tropical 
Upper Tropospheric Trough (TUTT).  The TUTT creates high winds around the islands, which 
are detrimental to development or support of a hurricane or tropical storm.  Because of this, most 
lower-level storms go either north, south, or through the islands, but do not develop further.
292
   
 While the TUTT does help the Islands avoid many storms, it does not keep them all 
away.  Hawaii is particularly vulnerable to storms that originate from the Southwest and move 
North.  These storms occur when the TUTT is displaced slightly to the North, which was more 
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common during the El Nino years.  Some notable examples of this were Hurricane Iniki in 1992, 
Hurricane Iwa in 1982, and Hurricane Nina in 1957.
 293  
Of these, the most devastating was Iniki, 
which struck Kauai, and affected Oahu.  In total, the storm caused 2.3 billion dollars in property 
damage and took the lives of three people.  In Oahu, wind gusts reached upwards of 160 miles 
per hour, and water overtook Waikiki Beach, flooding some of the hotels located there.
294
 
In very rare cases, a hurricane can hit from the East or Southeast.  This generally happens 
when a hurricane comes from a low latitude then takes a Northwest or North-Northwest turn 
towards the islands, thus encountering the TUTT for only a short period of time.  Because of this, 
the storm is unable to weaken from the strong TUTT wind shear.
295
  This was the case when 
Hurricane Dot approached the Hawaiian Islands in 1959.  This storm caused only minor damage 
in Oahu, but six million dollars of agricultural damage to Kauai.
296
   
Although hurricanes are fairly rare in the Hawaiian Islands, it is possible for a powerful 
hurricane to hit Oahu.  If this were to happen, the effect on the USS Arizona Memorial could be 
devastating.  While the muddy bottom would help to cushion the wreckage in the event of a 
storm, a strong enough hurricane could possibly dislodge the Arizona.
297
  Even though the rivets 
are not currently near their critical structure point, in a worst case scenario, if a powerful storm 
were to hit the ship, the hull plates could be separated, thereby destabilizing the ship.
298
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In an absolutely worst case scenario, if a storm were to dislodge some of the ship’s hull 
plating, the result could possibly puncture a portion or all of the oil tanks that are currently 
buried deep within the ship.  If the oil tanks were compromised, the previously mentioned 
current amount of between 500,000 and 600,000 gallons (1,892,705.89 and 2,271247.07 liters) 
of bunker C oil would be released into the harbor.  This situation could be similar to the Erika 
disaster presented in the previous chapter.  The 3,700 ton tanker Erika sank in 1999 during a 
winter storm.  As the ship went down, it broke in half, releasing thousands of tons of oil.  
Although the ship sank only approximately 30 miles off of the nearest coast, and began leaking 
oil almost immediately, cleaning efforts were greatly hindered by storms.  Because of this, nearly 
249 miles of the French coastline was damaged by the oil that originated from the Erika.
299
  
If oil were to be catastrophically released into the harbor, it would not be the first time 
that the area has encountered this type of problem.  In 1987, 100,000 gallons of jet fuel was 
released from a pipeline into the Middle Loch portion of Pearl Harbor.  This spill caused damage 
to the surrounding environment.  Leaf yellowing, defoliation, and the partial loss of 
approximately 9.5 acres of mangroves were all outcomes of this release.
300
  Although jet fuel is 
much lighter than the heavy #6 fuel oil that is currently within the Arizona, the spill impeded 
normal actions at the Naval Base for two months.
301
   
Although the spill was not as large, the effects of the Chevron pipeline spill into Waiau 
Stream and Pearl Harbor were significantly more devastating.  At 1:30 am on May 14, 1996, a 
section of the Chevron pipeline, which had been weakened from outside erosion, gave way 
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releasing heavy #6 bunker oil into the Waiau Stream.  Here, the oil sank until it met the heavier 
salt water of Pearl Harbor, afterwhich it rose to the surface.  The pipeline continued to leak for 
two weeks, for a total loss of approximately 41,244 gallons (156,125.52 liters) of oil that, within 
the first six days of the leakage event, covered 2,290 acres of open water.  Immediate effects of 
the spill included the closing of Pearl Harbor to navigation traffic and boating and fishing, and 
the closing of the USS Arizona Memorial.  Sections of the jogging and biking paths surrounding 
East Loch also had to be closed to public traffic.  The multiple different types of shorelines, 
including mudflats, rocky shores, mangroves, sandy beaches, riprap, seawalls, and piers along 
the perimeter of both Pearl Harbor and Waiau Stream were affected by the spill.  In total, 25 
acres of intertidal habitat in East Loch, Pearl Harbor were oiled because of the 1996 spill. When 
efforts were begun to clean the oil, booms, skimmers, chemical agents, pompoms, and pads were 
all utilized.  High power steam cleaners were also used on the shorelines to remove the oil.  At 
the USS Arizona Monument, all visitation was ceased from May14-18
th
, and restricted from May 
18-22
nd
.  Despite the cleaning that occurred between May 14-22
nd
, the shoreline near the 
monument continued to show an iridescent sheen in excess of a month.
302
   
Although the efforts to clean the shoreline were all meant to be beneficial, many of the 
procedures, such as the high power washing, and removal of vegetation, further damaged the 
shore.  Exacerbating the problem, particularly bad rainstorms occurred in November of the same 
year, which led to extensive erosion at the visitor’s center.  Because of this, emergency efforts 
were needed, and sandbags were employed to fill in eroded areas.
303
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The shorelines were much more heavily affected than the macrofauna in the surrounding 
environment.  Only a minimal number of animals including several crabs, two mynah birds, one 
tilapia, four pufferfish, two freshwater prawns, and one young dove, were actually reported to 
have been found affected by oil contamination.
304
  Despite this, reports stated that the possibility 
of further animal exposure was high, and that it was not out of the question to believe that the 
area could take up to ten years for a full recovery from the damage.
305
   
The USS Arizona Memorial’s, oil recovery contingency plan would not be as effective if 
booms and skimmers could not be utilized quickly because of a storm.  The Coast Guard though 
does have plans in place for the Hawaiian Islands in the face of a hurricane.  Depending on the 
strength of the storm, the Captain of the Port (COTP) may decide to restrict or deny entry to oil 
tankers.  Although the COTP will continually monitor the area during the storm, only actions 
that preserve the lives of Coast Guard personnel and equipment will take place.  Directly after a 
devastating storm, the official contingency plan places emphasis on four key missions, one of 
which is spill response.
306
  By comparing the Coast Guard contingency plan to the events that 
occurred after the 1996 oil spill, it is clear that although the agencies are prepared for a spill, the 
effects could still be significant. 
 If a storm were to dislodge or break apart the Arizona for any reason, between 500,000 
and 600,000 gallons (1,892,705.89 and 2,271247.07 liters) of oil would be deposited into the 
small harbor.
307
  Although the current amount of oil leaking into the harbor has a negligible 
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effect on the environment, a release of this large amount of oil would have a definite effect on 
Pearl Harbor, as witnessed by the significantly smaller spill that occurred in 1996.
308
   
 As previously mentioned, the oil tanker Mississinewa was sunk in Micronesia in 1944, 
after being hit by a Japanese suicide torpedo.  This wreck was leaking at a fairly steady rate until 
July 2, 2001, when a typhoon ripped through the area, destabilizing the wreck.
309
  After a multi-
disciplinary study, the ship was found to be leaking in excess of 1,000 liters (264 gallons) per 
day.
310
  Despite the high winds that plagued the site, divers were able to assess the wreck and 
patch three areas that were leaking oil with concrete plugs and epoxy.
311
     
 The Mississinewa wreck and remediation has multiple attributes that correspond to the 
Arizona.  Oil leaking from the Mississinewa was greatly increased after a storm.  This could be 
the same outcome as the Arizona if a storm were to rip through the area.  It was comforting to 
see that remediation efforts were completed on the Mississinewa, even in less than ideal weather 
conditions.
312
    
It does not take a hurricane though to initiate or increase leakage rates on wrecks.  
Multiple sites, including the White Whale and Costa Concordia, have shown increased leakage 
rates during periods of heavy winds.
313
  The White Whale was a 141 foot (43 meter) long supply 
vessel that sank off the coast of Umm Al-Quwain, United Arab Emirates.
314
  The White Whale 
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was carrying 440 tonnes (139,814 gallons) of diesel when it sank in 98 feet of water.
315
  The 
Minister, Dr. Mariam Al Shanasi, stated that the ship was not releasing diesel into the 
surrounding environment, but that the initial thought to salvage the vessel had not been 
abandoned.
316
  Contrary to governmental reports, local fishermen visually identified a trail of 
diesel originating from the wreck.  Because of this, many refused to fish in the area due to the 
fear of potential contamination of their catch.
317
  Although the Ministry of Environment and 
Water continued to reassure the public that the wreck was not hazardous, Dubai Ship Building 
was commissioned to retrieve the vessel.
318
       
The diesel leak reported by the fishermen was noticed after multiple days of rough seas 
had occurred over the wreck site.  This points to the potential of storms weaker than hurricanes 
affecting leakage rates.  The Arizona has been identified to leak more during days when there is 
more wave action at the site.  Vessel wake and windy days can cause the wreck to disgorge a 
higher volume of oil than it does when the environment is calm.
319
  The White Whale is 
significantly deeper than the Arizona, so storms would logically affect the Arizona more 
intensely.
320
   
Conclusion 
The USS Arizona is in an important point in its history.  Presented in this chapter are 
possible aspects of the wreck and its environment that assist both in its preservation and in its 
possible demise.  As presented by both the corrosion data and the FEA model, the majority of the 
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remaining ship is not in immediate danger of catastrophic hull failure due to corrosion.
321
  Both 
the mud that surrounds the Arizona, and the harbor environment, help preserve the wreck.  
Because of this, a best case scenario most closely follows the FEA model of corrosion, where the 
ship continues at a relatively steady rate of loss.  Also, one could hope that Pearl Harbor storms 
would be minimal, and would not greatly affect the wreck site, or if a storm did occur, that any 
oil loss could be quickly cleaned before it reached the fragile shoreline.        
In contrast, however, situations may arise that could negatively affect the wreck and the 
surrounding harbor.  Hurricanes are not frequent near the Hawaiian Islands, although current 
data shows the water there could support at least a category 4 hurricane.
322
  However, as both the 
White Whale and the Arizona itself have shown, it does not take a large storm to increase the 
leakage rate of a sunken oil containing vessel.
323
  In addition to a storm, the fire that raged 
through the ship on December 7, 1941 must also be taken into account as it certainly affected the 
stability of the steel.
324
  This increases the chance that the ship will collapse under its own weight 
long before the corrosion has reached 90 percent. 
While it is possible that neither the best nor worse case scenarios will ever come to pass, 
it is necessary to understand these possibilities.  It would be wonderful if the ship could retain its 
structure for the years projected by the corrosion rates or the FEA model, although the possibility 
of a premature collapse cannot be, and is not being ignored.  In many ways, it is more important 
to study a worst case scenario, because this works to prepare those involved for a situation where 
the Arizona is lost much sooner than currently expected.  The two extremes presented here will 
                                                 
321
Johnson et al., USS Arizona Pt.1, 2-5.  
322
 Lyons, "Hawaii's Savior from Hurricanes,". 
323
 Russell and Murphy, “Long-Term Monitoring”, 413; Yasin Kakande, "Shipwreck Is Leaking Oil, Fishermen 
Claim," 
324
 Stillwell, 225-259; Camp, 89; Venere, "Engineers Test Effects of Fire on Steel Structures”. 
77 
 
be reflected in the next chapter, entitled Conclusions and Recommendations for the USS Arizona 
Memorial Site. 
  
 
Chapter 4: Conclusions and Recommendations for the Future of the USS Arizona 
  
Information presented up to this point has been focused on answering the thesis questions 
presented in the introduction: Is the wreck of the USS Arizona in danger of structural failure on 
the bottom of Pearl Harbor, and what will be the ship’s continuing legacy and effect on the 
harbor’s environment?  This chapter will present the importance of the wreck, along with 
recommendations for the future of the site.   
 The site of the USS Arizona has the power to evoke a multitude of emotions.  Although 
the war that started for America with the bombing at Pearl Harbor has long since ended, the 
strong feelings that most feel upon visiting the USS Arizona site are apparent.  This aspect of the 
wreck has greatly affected its current state.  There are many seemingly forgotten wrecks, 
carrying thousands of gallons of oil, throughout the world today.  The majority of these 
anonymous wrecks are not nearly as closely tied to deep-seated emotions as Battleship Arizona.  
Had any one of these other wrecks begun to leak oil in an area as small as Pearl Harbor, it likely 
would have been removed or defueled years ago.  The emotions tied to the Arizona wreck greatly 
affect the actions performed on its deteriorating wreckage.  Fear of disturbing a war tomb or 
causing detrimental change to a National Monument makes it difficult for those associated with 
the site to work without the fear of controversy. 
 Controversy at the site can come from both sides of the site preservation and the oil loss 
issues.  Some believe that while the site is important to the country’s history and should thus be 
treated with respect, the environment needs to take precedence.  For this proactive group, the oil 
that looms within the Arizona presents a problem that is too potentially catastrophic to ignore.  
79 
 
Because of this, they believe that the oil must be removed for continued preservation of the site, 
as well as the environment.   
 On the other side of the issue are those who believe that the sacredness of the site trumps 
any potential damage that the oil is causing.  This more reactively focused group holds that the 
wreck should be allowed to deteriorate through the natural processes of the harbor.  Entering the 
wreck for any reason is frowned upon because of the potential to disturb the final resting place of 
approximately nine hundred sailors.
325
   
 These strong feelings highlight the historical importance of the site.  December 7, 1941 
was a vital point in the history of the United States as it marked the entrance of the country into 
World War II.  In addition to this, the wreck of the USS Arizona serves as a memorial, not only 
for the men lost on the Arizona, but for the Pearl Harbor attack as a whole.  Even the building of 
the memorial has ties to history involving celebrities such as Elvis Presley who sponsored a 
charity concert to raise a portion of the funds.
326
 
 Scientifically, the USS Arizona is a vital source of information concerning steel hull site 
formation processes.  Because of the ship’s previously mentioned emotional and historical 
significance, scientists from multiple disciplines have meticulously studied the wreck.  This 
provides the scientific world, as a whole, with a truly amazing data set.  Important information 
can be gleaned from the wreck of the Arizona, ranging from the effects of shallow, relatively still 
water on the corrosion rates of a steel wreck, to the way in which a ship will slowly collapse, and 
much more.     
 Environmentally, the USS Arizona presents the scientific world with an incredible 
amount of information about the effects of heavy bunker oil on a small, protected area over a 
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long period of time.  As shown in the previous chapters, the amount of oil currently exuded by 
the wreck is having a negligible effect on the surrounding harbor.
327
  This, though, would not be 
the case if a large spill were to occur, as was confirmed by the 1996 Chevron spill in Pearl 
Harbor.  While the Chevron leak produced a total of approximately 41,244 gallons of oil, i.e., 
only 6-8 percent of what is approximated to be contained within the Arizona today, it had a 
dramatic effect on the environment and the Harbor shoreline.
328
  From this, the potential effects 
of a catastrophic hull failure of the USS Arizona can be predicted.    
 There are of course, situations that could affect the wreck’s stability that were not 
included in this thesis in detail.  One such possibility would be an earthquake.  The Hawaiian 
Islands are made of volcanos, which greatly affect their stability.  Oahu, the island on which 
Pearl Harbor lies, has two major volcanos, both of which are dormant.
329
   Despite the volcanoes 
not being active, Oahu continues to experience fairly minor earthquakes approximately twice a 
year.  In contrast the Big Island experiences vastly more earthquakes, with a minor one occurring 
nearly daily.
330
  The last noteworthy earthquake occurred in Oahu on January 22, 2012.  This 
quake registered 5.0 on the Richter scale.  No reports of injury or damage were associated with 
this event.
331
  It would be possible in theory though for a large enough earthquake to disrupt the 
stability of the USS Arizona.  If the upper decks were to suddenly collapse, the additional weight 
could potentially destroy the lower areas of the wreck.   
 If a significant earthquake were to occur on the island of Oahu it could also affect the 
stability of the memorial.  Surrounding the wreckage of the USS Arizona are cylindrical 
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reinforced concrete pylons which support the memorial.  These are located approximately 6-10 
feet from the exterior of the wreck.  If an event such as an earthquake or hull failure occurred it 
is possible that the 14 inch case hardened steel plates could fail due to the continually 
deteriorating armor belt.  These plates could separate from the sides of the wreck and damage or 
potentially break the pylons, thus compromising the stability of the monument. 
332
  Although 
significant data on the possibility of an earthquake was not included in this thesis, it is just one of 
many situations that could unexpectedly occur.   
 A thorough study of the USS Arizona’s current situation leads to the conclusion that the 
oil contained within the ship should presently be remediated rather than removed.  This 
conclusion was not reached without a thorough investigation of the available data and 
corresponding case studies, or without significant caveats.  The Arizona, as an artifact of the 
moment at which the United States entered World War II, is arguably one of the most important 
vessels in our nation’s history.  Because of that, no decision about its future should be reached 
haphazardly.  Currently, the oil is not greatly affecting Pearl Harbor, and the hull shows no signs 
of imminent failure in areas surrounding oil containment bunkers.  In addition, the amount of 
potential cost and detriment to the hull from complete defueling does not currently outweigh the 
fairly low possibility of a storm or other disaster occurring at the site.  Despite this, there are 
suggestions for future work on the site that, in this author’s opinion, should be utilized to protect 
the harbor from extensive oil damage. 
 Although the conclusion reached is that the USS Arizona’s oil should not currently be 
fully removed, this does not mean that the potential for a catastrophic oil spill has been 
eliminated.  As the 2008 report from Mathew Russell and Larry Murphy indicates, the oil 
leakage rates were monitored in 1998, 2003, 2004, and 2006.  In my opinion, the length of time 
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between monitoring is too broad and non-standardized.  I believe that the USS Arizona’s oil 
leakage rate should be monitored more closely than it is now, since the ship is aging and 
deteriorating. Although the data show a significant increase in the oil leakage rate from the No. 4 
barbette between 1994 and 1998, all of the eight reported leaks since then seem to have leveled 
off or even decreased.  Because of the current stabilization of the leakage rate, I believe that it 
would be ideal for the ship to be monitored once per year.  In addition to this, all eleven of the 
leakage points throughout the ship need to be included to obtain a full assessment of how much 
oil is escaping on a daily basis.
333
   
This proposal however, only pertains to the ship if the leakage continues at its present 
steady rate.  If at any point the rate of oil loss is seen to increase, it would be necessary to 
decrease the intervals between the monitoring sessions.  If, after measuring the rate of leakage, 
the oil increase does not warrant removal at that time, monitoring should then be conducted 
annually, as the oil loss regains equilibrium.     
 While a consistent plan for monitoring the USS Arizona’s oil loss is important, there are 
other actions that could decelerate the oil leakage rate and potentially create a safer environment 
for the wreck.  Currently, the oil being lost from the ship has been analyzed to be fairly 
weathered.  As previously explained, this means that the oil is likely leaking into the internal 
structures of the ship before exiting through open ports and cracks.  This, though, is not the case 
for the oil leaking from the area surrounding barbette #4, designated in Figure 5 by the aft most 
circle, and in Figure 2, indicated as “Location A.” The oil emanating from this area was found to 
be unweathered, meaning it is coming directly from an original area of oil containment.  These 
are potentially the most dangerous of the 11 leakage points.  Unlike a failure of the other leakage 
areas throughout the ship, which would simply leak out the oil that had accumulated, a failure of 
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the deck and hull plating in the area of barbette #4 would expel all of the oil remaining in those 
bunkers supplying this leak.
334
   
Because of the danger associated with this specific leakage area, I propose that one or 
multiple patches, such as those attached to the Mississinewa, be placed over this leak after an 
investigation to determine the bunkers from which the leak was originating.  Although this 
method was unsuccessful for the Mississinewa because of its high leakage rate of over a 
thousand liters per day, I believe that it would be significantly more effective in the case of the 
USS Arizona.
335
 This solution would not only be less expensive than a complete defueling, but 
would also be significantly less invasive.   
 If a patch was deemed unhelpful in this area, it may be possible to execute a partial 
defueling on the barbette #4 leakage points.  Because oil is escaping to the surface, it should not 
be difficult to reverse the process to determine exactly which bunker(s) is expelling oil.  
Removing the oil would then likely be as straightforward as inserting a modified hot-tap into the 
offending bunkers and cleansing the tanks, a process that was conducted on the Princess 
Kathleen, and explained in the previous chapter.
336
   
 The hull itself also needs periodic monitoring.  The current rates of corrosion have been 
extrapolated into the future, by both this thesis and the FEA model, to produce a potential date of 
collapse for the historic wreck. Nevertheless, monitoring is still crucial to determine if these 
predictions are being proven correct.  Because the hull rates are more stable than the fluctuating 
leakage rates, investigations of the hull need not be conducted as frequently as those for oil loss.  
If a significant event such as a storm were to occur at the site, the hull stability would need to be 
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further assessed, both initially after the incident and frequently afterwards, until the wreck 
showed that it had regained a state of relative equilibrium.   
 Sudden changes in the hull stability could be caused by a storm.  Hurricanes, the most 
likely type of natural disaster to affect Hawaii, generally come with sufficient warning to 
evacuate potential victims.  This however would not be the case for the shipwreck.  There is little 
that could be done to protect the Arizona from a potentially hazardous storm.  Half across the 
world from Pearl Harbor, the fear of hurricanes affecting the Beaufort Inlet Wreck, also 
tentatively known as Blackbeard’s Queen Anne’s Revenge, prompted the state of North Carolina 
to create berms to protect the site.  Built in 2006, these artificial sand bars were placed 420 feet 
(128 meters) from the wreck and span 600 feet (182.88 meters) long and 200 feet (60.96 meters) 
wide.
337
  As of 2011, and the assessment of the effects of Hurricane Irene, the berms were seen 
as continuing to produce beneficial results.  Sand scour and storm damage were both minimized 
by the berms.
338
  For the Arizona, the time between when a hurricane warning is issued and the 
storm actually hitting could be dedicated to fine tuning a disaster recovery plan and potentially 
creating berms such as what were used on the Beaufort Inlet Wreck.  In addition to this, 
stabilization of the ship, if needed, would be crucial, as would be a review of the existing 
emergency planning to contain and remove expelled oil.   
 As presented in the previous chapter, the oil currently contained within the USS Arizona 
has the possibility of being hazardous to the environment if expelled in large amounts.  Current 
visual and scientific studies of the environment surrounding the wreck are optimistic about the 
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amount of damage occurring.
339
  As shown by the 1996 Chevron spill, if a large oil release were 
to occur, the No. 6 bunker oil spill would obviously need to be quickly mitigated.
340
  Because of 
the minimal wave action in the harbor, and the PAH level of the oil, the fuel would likely remain 
on the surface, with only a minimal amount becoming water-soluble or combining with the 
sediment.
341
  These features, along with a fast clean-up using booms to skim the oil from the 
surface of the water, would minimize the effect on the surrounding species, thereby avoiding a 
situation like the Erika spill.
342
  
If, at some point in the future, the oil needed to be removed, a combination of what was 
executed on the Mississinewa, and what has already been done on the USS Arizona might be the 
best solution.  On the Mississinewa, when defueling was determined to be the only option, it was 
completed in a manner that avoided potential human remains.  This was possible because the 
ship had settled upside down on the seafloor, thus exposing the tanks to the defueling crew.
343
  
Currently, researchers working on the USS Arizona have conducted multiple ROV studies on 
portions of the internal structures of the ship.  Although none of these identified any human 
remains, there is evidence that they could still be present.
344
   
If the necessity arose that the ship had to be defueled, a high definition camera mounted 
on the ROV would aid researchers in avoiding possible human remains.  A cutting implement, 
also mounted to the ROV, could maneuver in those areas too small or too dangerous for 
conventional divers.  Lastly, a dredge head, such as the ZJS100 ROV Dredge Pump® made by 
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Advanced Marine Innovation Technology Subsea Ltd., could be attached to the ROV to assist in 
any sediment removal that would inevitably be necessary.
345
   
 If defueling is ever deemed necessary, videos such as those made for the Princess 
Kathleen would be crucial to quell the anxiety that would likely be felt by the surrounding 
community, if not by the entire nation.
346
  These informative movies would need to include 
thorough but engaging information on the ship’s history, combined with why the defueling was 
necessary.  This would need to be presented in a way that was both scientific and accessible to 
the general public.  If an ROV was used and found no human remains in the work areas, these 
videos should also be used as part of the presentation.  As the defueling progressed, there would 
invariably be publicity surrounding the event. This could be advantageous to the work being 
done if local and national news broadcasting networks were provided with updates and 
commentary from those working on the wreck, thereby helping the nation to feel more connected 
to the process.  By showing the public that the decision to remove the oil was not arrived at 
easily, and that the work is being completed in a respectful manner, people’s fears should be 
alleviated.  
All of these recommendations are somewhat idealistic.  There is likely neither a sufficient 
amount of money nor manpower at present to effectively conduct the remediation efforts 
presented here.  However, while costly, these efforts would prevent disaster remediation and also 
assist in better educating the public regarding the continued stability of the USS Arizona and the 
oil which it currently contains.  Much of the information that is easily accessible to the public is 
approximately three years old.  Creating a forum, potentially associated with a social networking 
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site such as Facebook, could inform the public as to both the leakage rates and the hull 
deterioration.  By doing this, at least some of the fears associated with the remaining oil could 
potentially be alleviated.  This more personal connection to the site could also increase the 
number of people who donate to the USS Arizona Memorial, thereby increasing the revenue that 
cyclically could be used to continue the ship’s monitoring.         
 The USS Arizona will always be an important National Monument.  Even if the ship must 
eventually be defueled, which may cause irreparable damage to its structural integrity, the 
feelings behind the ship’s importance would still remain.  Simply changing the shape of the 
monument should not and does not take away its emotional impact.  Since little remediation is 
currently occurring, the ship is naturally continuing to change.  For many that visit the memorial, 
this is not only satisfactory, but preferable.  Unlike many sunken ships, which lend themselves to 
thoughts of treasure and wealth, the USS Arizona is currently and will forever be a tomb and 
reminder of national preparedness as well as a memorial to the men who lost their lives during 
the day which shall live in infamy.
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